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Despite the valiant efforts of feminists, the position of women in the
United States and elsewhere in the industrial world is still characterized
by significant inequality and oppression." Women are segregated into low-
paying, low-status jobs;2 under-represented in political institutions and
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1. The following works survey the position of women in various countries and find in most in-
stances that women's position is generally less favorable in other industrialized countries than it is in
the United States: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR WOMEN (R. Ratner ed. 1980) (data on Austria,
Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States); WOMEN:
ROLES AND STATUS IN EIGHT COUNTRIES (J. Giele & A. Smock eds. 1977) (surveying both industri-
alized and non-industrialized countries: Egypt, Bangladesh, Mexico, Ghana, Japan, France, United
States, Poland). See also FAMILY POLICY: GOVERNMENT AND FAMILIES IN FOURTEEN COUNTRIES (S.
Kamerman & A. Kahn eds. 1978) (discussing policies concerning equality between the sexes and data
about women's situations in the context of family policy in Sweden, Norway, Hungary, Czechoslova-
kia, France, Austria, Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, Finland, Denmark, United Kingdom,
Canada, Israel, United States). Sex discrimination, sex segregation, and sex-based hierarchy are even
more extensive in most non-industrial countries than in the industrial world. See, e.g., WOMEN:
ROLES AND STATUS IN EIGHT COUNTRIES, supra; E. BOSERUP, WOMAN'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT (1970).
2. A. SIMMONS, A. FREEDMAN, M. DUNKLE & F. BLAU, EXPLOITATION FROM 9 TO 5, at 43-63
(1975) In fact, the proportion of occupations with a high female concentration (70% to 90%), as well
as of those with a high male concentration, has steadily increased over the last 30 years. Laws, Psy-
chological Dimensions of Labor Force Participation of Women, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU-
NITY AND THE AT&T CASE 125, 126-27 (P. Wallace ed. 1976). More than one-quarter of all women
in the labor force work in jobs that are 95% or more female, and over three-fifths of all women work
in jobs that are at least 75% female. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS
89-91. In 1973, nearly two-fifths of all women workers were employed as secretaries, retail trade
salesworkers, bookkeepers, private household workers, elementary school teachers, waitresses, typists,
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processes;' saddled with large amounts of unpaid and often tedious work
in the home;4 and subjected to crippling stereotyping and channeling from
early infancy through adulthood.5 The impact of these patterns on rela-
cashiers, seamstresses and stitchers, and registered nurses. Id. at 91. In 1978, the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights concluded that at least one-third of the minority males and two-thirds to
three-fourths of the majority females would have to change occupations in order for their groups to
have occupational distributions similar to the majority males. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL
INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN 45-46 (1978). The fact that women occupy
lower status jobs is reflected in the small number of women administrators and managers. In 1973,
only 5% of all working women held such jobs, and women comprised only 18% of this occupational
group, although by 1974 women were 39% of the urban labor force. In addition, 20% of women
administrators and managers were self-employed or unpaid family workers. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
supra, at 11, 96. Moreover, within individual occupations, women are still clustered in lower job
levels. Barrett, Women in the Job Market: Occupations, Earnings, and Career Opportunities, in THE
SUBTLE REVOLUTION 31, 38-40 (R. Smith ed. 1979). In 1956, the median earnings of women em-
ployed full-time, year-round were 63.3% of the median earnings of full-time, year-round male work-
ers. By 1975, the situation had worsened slightly: Women's median earnings were only 58.8% of the
men's median. Id. at 34.
3. In 1981, there were two women in the U.S. Senate (2% of that body), 18 women in the U.S.
House of Representatives (4.1%), 46 women on the federal bench (6.9%), 908 women state senators
and representatives (12.1%), and 34 women holding statewide elective office (11.5%). Over the past 25
years, notwithstanding occupational and educational gains made by women, only six women have
served in the Cabinet. These statistics were provided by the National Information Bank on Women in
Public Office, a project of the Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute,
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J., on October 15, 1982. In 1979, only 3% of state trial and
appellate judgeships were held by women; moreover, in 17 states no women held these positions. Brief
for Amicus Curiae National Organization for Women at 24 n.22, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981).
4. Recent studies show that the wife performs about 70% of the housework in an average house-
hold, with the husband and children each providing about 15%. Included in the wife's weekly share of
domestic work are eight hours generated specifically by the husband's needs. The time devoted to
housework increases dramatically when there are young children in the home and decreases when
both parents work outside the home. One reason why the women's share of housework is so large is
that the wife is largely responsible for child care. In families with very young or very many children,
the wife takes on the extra burden; the husband's contribution to housework remains about the same
regardless of family size or the age of the youngest child. It is thus the wife who, with respect to
housework at least, does virtually all of the adjusting to the family life cycle. Moreover, the woman
who also works for wages finds that her husband spends about as little time on housework on average
as the husband whose wife is not a wage earner. As a result, full-time women wage earners continue
to spend a minimum of 30 hours per week maintaining the house and husband, compared to a mini-
mum of 40 hours per week for women who do not work for wages. Finally, on the basis of the limited
data available concerning socioeconomic status and race, it appears that time spent on housework by
wives is not very sensitive to differences in class, race, and ethnicity. Hartmann, The Family as the
Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN
CULTURE & SOC'Y 366, 377-86 (1981); see Vanek, Household Work, Wage Work, and Sexual
Equality, in WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR 275, 276-80 (S. Berk ed. 1980). Note that these discus-
sions do not include the housework of single parents, the vast majority of whom are women.
For discussions of the negative aspects of housework and child care as presently organized, see J.
BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 26-53 (1972); A. OAKLEY, WOMEN'S WORK: THE HOUSE-
WIFE, PAST AND PRESENT 91-104 (Vintage ed. 1976); A. OAKLEY, THE SOCIOLOGY OF HOUSEWORK
79-99, 182-84 (1974). But see H. LOPATA, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE 362-76 (1971) (arguing that
during late 1960's and early 1970's middle-class housewives were frequently using their role as basis
for satisfying, creative, multi-faceted lives).
5. The literature on the existence and harmful effects of sex stereotyping and sex-based channel-
ing into social roles and occupations is voluminous. See, e.g., E. BELOTI, LITTLE GIRLS (1975); J.
BROOKS-GUNN & W. MATTHEWS, HE & SHE: HOW CHILDREN DEVELOP THEIR SEX-ROLE IDEN-
TITY (1979); C. EPSTEIN, WOMAN'S PLACE 50-85 (1970); N. ROMER, THE SEx-ROLE CYCLE: SOCIAL-
IZATION FROM INFANCY TO OLD AGE (1980); Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson & Rosen-
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tions between men and women, on family life, and on political and eco-
nomic institutions is profound.
The subordination of women has traditionally been justified by argu-
ments drawn from biology or nature, in turn often equated with divine
command.6 The details of women's oppression-such as denial of the vote
or exclusion from the legal profession-have been said to flow directly and
unanswerably from biology itself.7 Such arguments deny both the desira-
bility and possibility of change. Change is not desirable because social
arrangements based on nature are seen as consistent with ultimate stan-
dards of legitimacy, such as divine intent or objective science.' Moreover,
attempts to change arrangements dictated by nature are by definition
doomed to failure.
Since its reemergence in the 1960's, the American women's movement
has challenged both the social practice of subordinating women and the
naturalistic arguments that attempt to sustain this practice.' Given the
krantz, Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal, J. SOC. ISSUES, 1972 no. 2, at 59; Morgan,
Female and Male Attitudes Toward Life: Implications for Theories of Mental Health, 6 SEX ROLES
367 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring); Declaration of Sentiments-Adopted by the First
Women's Rights Convention, Seneca Falls, N.Y., July 19, 1848, reprinted in B. BABCOCK, A. FREED-
MAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 1-2
(1975).
7. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (legal profession); E. DUBOIS,
FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE 45-46 (1978) (women's natural dependence on men as precluding extension
of franchise to women or their entrance into professions); E. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, FOR HER
OWN GOOD 91-126 (1978) (reliance on biology to explain frailty and sickliness of women and to
justify their subordination); S. ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE 23-26 (1978) (limitations thought
to result from women's biological characteristics and physical frailty).
8. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 1, ch. 5 (natural superiority of men and inferiority of
women makes male rule necessary); 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 208-13, 221-24
(rev. ed. 1889), excerpted in ROOT OF BITTERNESS 122-25 (N. Cott ed. 1972) (Americans recognize
wide differences in physical and moral constitution and therefore carefully distinguish between duties
of men and women); A. GRAVES, WOMAN IN AMERICA 143-49, 152-64 (1841), excerpted in ROOT OF
BITTERNESS, supra, at 141-47 (home is by divine injunction and design, as well as by dictates of
enlightened human reason, woman's appropriate and appointed sphere of action); L. TIGER, MEN IN
GROUPS (1969) (biological origins and social utility of formation of all-male and all-female groups
within society); E. ERIKSON, Womanhood and the Inner Space, in IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 261
(1968) (awareness of having "inner productive space" plays important role in shaping women's iden-
tities). Sigmund Freud's writings have often been cited as examples of biological determinism, see,
e.g., MASCULINE/FEMININE 19 (B. Roszak & T. Roszak eds. 1969); K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS
176-203 (1970), but this may oversimplify Freud's position, particularly as it evolved over time, see J.
MITCHELL, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM 5-131 (1974).
For a discussion of other sociological and psychological writings between 1930 and 1960 about the
natural bases of sex differences and proper sex roles, see J. MITCHELL, supra, at 203-33. For a list of
references arguing for and against a biological basis for sex differences and sex roles, see "FEMININ-
ITY," "MASCULINITY," AND "ANDROGYNY": A MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION 301-20 (M. Vet-
terling-Braggin ed. 1982).
9. For a description of the resurgence of the women's movement in the 1960's, see J. HOLE & E.
LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM (1971); J. MITCHELL, WOMAN'S ESTATE 11-96 (1971). The major
ideas of the movement, particularly critiques of the "biological differences" argument and analyses of
the sex-role system that maintains women's subordination, are discussed in M. CARDEN, THE NEW
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unusual importance of litigation and legal argument in modern American
reform politics, it is not surprising that the movement has emphasized a
legal theory of equal rights-the right of each individual to equal treat-
ment based on equal performance."0 This theory challenges biological de-
terminism by asserting that there is substantial overlap between women
and men as to most characteristics relevant to social roles and career op-
tions. Therefore, the argument continues, individuals should be free to
choose among social roles and careers on the basis of their individual incli-
nations and talents, rather than be channeled into particular roles and
careers on the basis of rigid and inaccurate notions about female and male
capacities. From this perspective, biology cannot justify excluding women
from (for example) the legal profession. Particular women are well quali-
fied to be attorneys; and women, like men, should be free to choose the
careers in which to express their abilities.
Between the early 1960's and the late 1970's, equal rights principles of
this sort were incorporated to a greater or lesser extent into federal and
state legislation"' and judicial doctrine, and were used successfully to chal-
lenge many forms of sex discrimination.:2 For a time, it seemed possible
FEMINIST MOVEMENT 9-15 (1974); J. HOLE & E. LEVINE, supra, at 169-225.
10. The women's movement of the late 1960's and early 1970's spanned a wide political spec-
trum, including organizations defining themselves as radical feminists, those focusing on women's
liberation, those describing themselves as socialist feminists or Marxist-feminists, and those focusing
on a liberal program of women's rights reforms. These groups agreed on some issues (for example,
reproductive freedom, equal employment opportunity) but disagreed on others (for example, the polit-
ical and personal desirability of heterosexuality, and separatism as a strategy or a goal). See M.
CARDEN, supra note 9, at 9-16, 47-56 (overview of feminist ideology and radical feminist subgroups);
J. HOLE & E. LEVINE, supra note 9, at 17-107 (discussing history and current status of several
national women's rights organizations).
The liberal theory of women's rights has been more widely accepted among women than have other
more radical views. In particular, such views have played a major role in the politics of the National
Organization for Women (NOW), which is the largest and best known women's movement organiza-
tion in the United States. For a critical description and evaluation of the emphasis placed by the
mainstream of the women's movement on a liberal theory of individual rights, see Z. EISENSTEIN,
THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 4-11, 177-200, especially at 192-97 (1981) (positions
of NOW).
11. Federal anti-discrimination laws include the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982); the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982); the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976), and the
National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5 (1982). For a discussion of state anti-discrimination laws,
state equal rights amendments, and state law reform to eliminate sex discrimination, see B. BROWN,
A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW: THE IMPACT OF THE ERA
ON STATE LAWS (1977).
12. Successful challenges have been mounted in such diverse areas as high school and college
athletics, Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975); sex-based insurance rates, Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 65 Pa. Commw. 249, 442 A.2d 382 (1982), leave
to appeal granted, No. 55 E.D. App. Docket 1982 (Pa. Aug. 24, 1982); government social insurance
programs, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); and sex discrimination in many
types of employment, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (airline flight attendants); Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel.
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that either through judicial interpretation of the equal protection clause,
or through ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, sex-based laws
would be generally struck down.1" To date, however, equal rights princi-
ples have not prevailed in the constitutional amendment process, and have
not been embraced wholeheartedly by the Supreme Court.
Although many women benefited from the relatively modest social and
legal reforms of the 1970's, the great majority of women remain trapped
in traditional patterns of sex segregation and sex-based hierarchy. Some of
the explanation for this phenomenon lies in continued resistance to the
ideal of equal treatment regardless of sex. The ideal as traditionally un-
derstood, however, itself challenges only some forms of sexual hierarchy
while validating others. Understanding the limitations and ambiguities of
the traditional ideal is thus a necessary first step toward the development
of the new analytic tools required for the achievement of sex equality.
This Article examines the struggle over the meaning of equal rights
theory in one of its more influential contexts: the sex discrimination deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. Of course, questions about the meaning of
equal rights theory are not the monopoly of the Supreme Court; rather,
they are continuously (if not always consciously) debated in all branches
and at all levels of government, and in society at large. Nonetheless,
American courts (in contrast to courts in many other countries) function
as a major forum in which equal rights theory is debated and articulated,
and legal concepts of equality continue to have a significant influence on
broader movements for social reform.
The struggle within the Court over the meaning of sexual equality can
be framed in terms of three questions. First, are sex differences and their
social consequences natural (and thus inevitable) or cultural (and hence
subject to change)?"4 Second, if particular sex differences or their social
consequences are cultural in origin, are they desirable or harmful?
1 5
Third, assuming that harms exist, are they sufficiently important to justify
major social investment to reduce both the extent and the consequences of
various types of sex differences?1"
Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (telephone coin box collectors); Pa. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 41
(1973) (boxers and wrestlers); Pa. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71 (1971) (teenage newspaper carriers).
13. The high water mark of the effort to obtain strict scrutiny of sex classifications was Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of the standard contemplated
by the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 888-909
(1971).
14. Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (Stewart, J.), discussed infra pp. 936-
37 with id. at 341, 345-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting in pertinent part), discussed infra pp. 935-37.
15. Compare Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (O'Connor, J.), dis-
cussed infra pp. 957-60 with id. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting), discussed infra pp. 959-60.
16. Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (Stewart, J.), discussed infra pp. 935-
37 with id. at 341, 345-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting in pertinent part), discussed infra notes 122, 226.
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After briefly summarizing pre-1970 judicial doctrine, this Article
presents an analysis and critique of the two major approaches to these
questions and to the underlying problem of sex discrimination that emerge
from the Supreme Court's recent equal protection and employment dis-
crimination decisions. One approach is articulated primarily by Justices
Rehnquist and Stewart,1 the other by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
The critique of the Rehnquist-Stewart approach focuses on two of its fea-
tures: first, its broad conception of "natural" or "real" differences between
women and men; and second, its lack of concern about most rules not
explicitly based on sex, even those that disproportionately burden women
and contribute significantly to their subordination. In taking these posi-
tions, the Rehnquist-Stewart approach denies that significant harms flow
from sex-based laws and disproportionately burdensome neutral rules; it
holds that the "real" differences between the sexes have necessary-and
not undesirable-social consequences. The critique argues that cultural
and political choices, rather than biology, determine the extent of equality
between the sexes in any given society, and that a recognition of this fact
is a precondition to any serious effort to promote sex equality.
The Brennan-Marshall approach presents a more complex picture.
Justices Brennan and Marshall have, with two exceptions," voted to
strike down every sex-based classification, pregnancy classification, and
disproportionately burdensome neutral rule that the Court has fully con-
sidered. Their votes and their opinions reflect a recognition of the cultural
origins of sex differentiation, the harms caused by sex discrimination, and
the importance and feasibility of remedies. At the same time, their opin-
ions place far more emphasis on the irrationality of particular rules as
means to the government's asserted goals than on the relationship of the
rules to sexism. The resulting messages about sex discrimination and
equal rights theory are therefore ambiguous. Sexism is deeply embedded
in the basic social, economic, and political structures of contemporary soci-
ety. Significant change will require a far more searching critique than the
Brennan-Marshall approach has yet articulated. The Article concludes
with a discussion of the elements of such a critique, and a plea for more
probing judicial analysis of sexism and its social context.
I. Pre-1970 Equal Protection Doctrine
Until recently, many governmental rules reflected and reinforced tradi-
tional sex roles. Some rules prohibited women from entering male do-
17. Justice Stewart retired from the Supreme Court effective July 3, 1981; his seat was filled by
the Court's first woman member, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, on September 25, 1981.
18. Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per
curiam), discussed infra note 194.
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mains such as the military 9 or, in the nineteenth century, the profes-
sions. 20 Other rules, or the absence of rules, tolerated employer and union
exclusion of women from many desirable occupations and trades21 and the
segregation of women workers into low-paying, low-status jobs.22 Married
women were consigned by law to a separate and inferior status, both
within their families and in public life.23 Many laws and programs en-
couraged adherence to sex-based norms by allocating benefits to those
whose life choices followed traditional patterns and by penalizing those
who made non-traditional choices. For example, divorce laws provided al-
imony only to women, thereby penalizing economically dependent hus-
bands.24 Conversely, male workers were rewarded and female workers
punished by the assumption, embodied in wage rates2 5 and fringe benefit
19. Prior to World War II, women were, with rare exceptions, completely excluded from military
service. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 269 n.21 (1979). Even after the creation of the
Women's Army Corps in 1943, women's participation in the military was strictly limited by statute
and regulation until the mid-1970's to no more than 2% of total enlisted strength. Id. at 270 n.21. In
addition, "enlistment and appointment requirements have been more stringent for females than males
with respect to age, mental and physical aptitude, parental consent, and educational attainment." Id.
at 284 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Women remain excluded from the military draft, see Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), discussed infra pp. 953-54, and from combat duty, see id. at 76-77,
with consequent disadvantage for promotion opportunities, see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
508 (1975), discussed infra p. 939; Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE
L.J. 1533 (1973); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 967-79.
20. See supra notes 6, 7. The first woman to be regularly admitted to practice law in the United
States was Arabella Mansfield of Iowa, who was admitted in 1869. 2 NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN
1607-1950, at 492 (E. James ed. 1971). The first woman in modem times to graduate in medicine
was Elizabeth Blackwell, who received her medical degree from Geneva College in 1849. 1 id. at 162-
63.
21. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, supra note 6, at 19-53.
22. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (continuing impact of ex-
plicit employer and union policies of sex segregation and sex-based wage differentials found to violate
Equal Pay Act); International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980) (involving claim that present pay scheme carried forward disparities
resulting from earlier scheme under which women's wages (but not men's wages) were intentionally
set at less than employer job evaluation would warrant), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981); Shultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.) (sex-based wage disparities and sex segregation found not
to be justified by asserted differences between jobs in question), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). See
generally cases collected in M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 541-664 (1982).
23. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century law concerning married women is reviewed in B. BAB-
COCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, supra note 6, at 561-66.
24. Traditionally, alimony was only available to wives because it was understood as a continua-
tion of the husband's marital duty to support his wife. Since the wife had no duty to support the
husband, he could not receive alimony. For a discussion of this tradition and a summary of the histori-
cal background of alimony in England and the United States, see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 420-22, 448 (1968). By 1976, only 15 states limited alimony or
maintenance upon divorce to wives. B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, supra note 11,
at 130-34. In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the Supreme Court invalidated Alabama's sex-based
alimony law on equal protection grounds.
25. For discussions of the so-called "family wage" that was supposed to provide a man with
enough money to allow the woman to stay home, raise children, and maintain the family, see N.
SOKOLOFF, BETWEEN MONEY AND LOVE: THE DIALECTICS OF WOMEN'S HOME AND MARKET WORK
167-77, 214, 228-33, 238 (1980) and works cited therein; Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of
Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION 1, 21-27
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programs,"6 that men-but not women-provided economic support for
their families. Finally, a number of laws effectively excluded women from
traditionally male jobs by limiting their hours and time of work, and by
regulating other conditions of employment, in the name of "protecting"
them from supposedly sex-specific harms.27
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court almost invariably concluded that
such rules were consistent with the basic principles of equality embodied
in the Constitution, primarily in the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 The Court's first major consider-
ation of sex-based rules under the equal protection clause29 occurred in
the 1908 case of Muller v. Oregon,"0 which involved an employer's chal-
lenge to a state law limiting women's employment in factories and laun-
dries to ten hours per day. In rejecting the employer's argument that this
law interfered with constitutional rights of liberty of contract previously
established for men, 1 the Court asserted that even if a woman were
placed on "an absolutely equal plane" with a man as far as political and
legal status is concerned,
it would still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon
and look to him for protection; that her physical structure and a
proper discharge of her maternal functions-having in view not
(L. Sargent ed. 1981).
26. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 143-46 (1980) (statute denied
widower benefits on his wife's work-related death unless he was mentally or physically handicapped
or dependent on her earnings, but granted widow benefits without proof of her dependence on her
husband's earnings); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201 (1977) (survivor's benefits payable to
widow in any event, but to widower only if he had been receiving at least one-half of his support from
deceased wife); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973) (plurality opinion) (spouses of
male members of uniformed services deemed dependents for purposes of obtaining increased quarters
allowance and medical benefits but spouses of female members not deemed dependents unless in fact
dependent for one-half of their support).
27. As late as 1968, 38 states limited women's hours of work per day and prohibited overtime
work at desirable premium pay; 18 states prohibited or regulated night work for women; 10 states
excluded women from work requiring lifting more than a given weight, ranging from 15 to 50
pounds; 26 states excluded women from certain occupations, primarily mining and bartending; and
varying numbers required special conditions of employment for women such as a meal period, a rest
period, a day of rest, and chairs. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 924. The
historical and legal background of protective labor legislation for women is discussed in B. BABCOCK,
A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, supra note 6, at 26-53; B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ &
A. PRICE, supra note 11, at 209-19.
28. The Court's pre-1970 opinions are excerpted and extensively discussed in B. BABCOCK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, supra note 6, at 4-58, 71-108. Justice Brennan articulated a
critical view of the pre-1970 opinions in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plu-
rality opinion).
29. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), holding that a statute excluding women
from the legal profession did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, placed primary emphasis on the
Court's restrictive interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Justice Bradley's famous concurring opinion is quoted infra note 278.
30. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
31. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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merely her own health, but the well-being of the race-justify legis-
lation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. 2
Women were thus "inherently"3 3 different from men, and this difference
justified disparate legal treatment. Later cases typically cited Muller, and
summarily referred to the futility of requiring legal equality where there
is "a real difference."1
3 4
Differential treatment was also justified by reference to the legislative
goal of promoting certain sex-based roles. For example, in 1961 the Su-
preme Court upheld Florida's blanket exemption of women from compul-
sory jury service 5 on the ground that a "woman is still regarded as the
center of home and family life," and therefore could be excused because of
her "special responsibilities. '38 The Court did not take into account the
fact that the asserted differences applied only to some women, that many
male occupational activities were equally inconsistent with jury service, or
that the jury exemption might interfere with the right to a trial by a jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community.
The reemergence of the women's movement37 and the complex social
changes of the 1960's8 made possible a new series of challenges to sex
discrimination. A major feminist goal was to gain access for women to
opportunities previously reserved to men, and to obtain equal rewards for
women once they achieved such access.3 9 Largely as a result of feminists'
32. 208 U.S. at 422.
33. Id. at 423.
34. See, e.g., Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 62-63 (1912); c. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (constitutional propriety of "sharp line between the sexes" asserted without
further justification). But see Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum
wage law for women only on grounds that such restrictions, unlike maximum hours laws, were not
related to physical differences between women and men and were inconsistent with recent changes in
women's contractual, political, and cultural status that placed women on equal legal plane with men).
On the impact of Muller, see B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, supra note 6, at
33-35; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 877 n.11.
35. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58 (1961). The Florida law permitted women to volunteer
for jury service, but at the time of Gwendolyn Hoyt's trial, only 220 women out of approximately
46,000 registered female voters had done so, and only 10 women were actually included in the list of
10,000 prospective jurors, id. at 64-65. For analysis of the arguments in Hoyt, see B. BABCOCK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. ROSS, supra note 6, at 101-03.
36. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62.
37. See sources cited supra note 9.
38. IV. CHAFE, WOMEN AND EQUALITY 117-42 (1977) (importance of changed female work pat-
terns, decline in birth rate during 1960's and 1970's, and changes in sexual mores, in combination
with feminist ideology); J. MITCHELL, supra note 9, at 11-42 (expansion of access to higher educa-
tion, development of consumer capitalism, reactions to gap between liberal and radical ideology and
practice in 1960's); S. ROTHMAN, supra note 7, at 229-33 (impact of increases during the late 1950's
and 1960's in employment of married women and influence of the civil rights movement); Evans,
Tomorrow's Yesterday: Feminist Consciousness and the Future of Women, in WOMEN OF AMERICA:
A HISTORY 389, 390-406 (C. Berkin & M. Norton eds. 1979) (increasing numbers of women profes-
sionals and of women's activities in civil rights movement).
39. See sources cited supra note 10.
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efforts, the federal Equal Pay Act,'0 requiring equal pay for equal work
without regard to sex, was passed in 1963. The following year, Congress
enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,41 prohibiting discrimi-
nation in employment on the basis of sex, as well as on the basis of race,
religion, and national origin.42 The new congressional commitment to sex
equality in employment was one of the many developments that set the
stage for judicial reexamination of the traditional assumption that legal
distinctions based on sex were invariably justified.
II. Contemporary Equal Protection and Title VII Doctrine
Starting in 1971, the Supreme Court began to reconsider its strong ap-
proval of all sex-based laws and of the traditional sex roles they re-
flected.43 But after more than a decade of searching for a new approach
under the equal protection clause and Title VII, the Court has been una-
ble to reach a consensus about how to review sex-based rules, neutral
rules that disproportionately burden one sex, and pregnancy classifica-
tions. Most members of the Court agree that maintenance of traditional
sex roles is no longer permissible as an explicit governmental or business
goal.4 ' But whenever a government or employer has asserted a different
goal, the Court has split into warring factions. It has been unable to agree
on the nature of sex differences, their relationship to legitimate goals, and
the correct standards for deciding cases involving these issues.
Before analyzing the positions taken by various Justices, it is useful to
clarify some basic concepts. It is evident that, considered as distinct
groups, women and men differ in many statistically measurable ways.
Most of these differences can be termed average differences, characteristic
40. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
42. Id. § 2000e-2 (1976).
43. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (administrative convenience does not justify statutory
preference for male relatives as administrators of intestate estates). For a discussion of the new stan-
dard used in the case, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV L. REV. 1, 18-
19 (1972).
44. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979)
(striking down Alabama statute imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives). In Stanton,
the Utah Supreme Court had upheld a lower age of majority for young women on the grounds that
young men needed more parental support for education in order to fulfill the traditional male role as
breadwinner. See 421 U.S. at 10. Justice Blackmun, writing for a majority of eight Justices, rejected
this statutory goal as both empirically false and, by strong implication, morally unjust. "No longer is
the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the
marketplace and the world of ideas," id. at 14-15, and legislation based on that premise, by encourag-
ing parents to withhold educational support from young women, created the very "role-typing society
has long imposed," id. Justice Rehnquist dissented on the grounds that in this case, involving a di-
vorced father's refusal to pay child support for his daughter after her eighteenth birthday, the parties'
divorce agreement-rather than the state law establishing a lower age of majority for women-might
have been the basis of the father's refusal to pay. Id. at 19-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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of women and men as groups, but as to which there is some degree of
overlap between the sexes. For example, men on the average are taller,
heavier, more proficient in mathematics, more aggressive, and have shorter
lifespans than women. Individual women, however, often are taller, heav-
ier, more proficient in mathematics, more aggressive, or have shorter lifes-
pans than individual men. While some average differences are caused in
part by biological factors, most have a significant cultural component.
45
In contrast to average differences, a few biological differences between
women and men might be termed "definitional." By definition, to be fe-
male is to possess certain physiological characteristics associated with sex-
uality and reproduction that males lack, and vice versa. Although there
are many women and men who lack one or more of the definitional char-
acteristics of their sex, there is little or no overlap between the sexes as to
these characteristics.4
Until recently, individuals in positions of authority-almost exclusively
male-did not distinguish between average and definitional differences,
and emphasized the biological rather than the cultural origins of the sex
differences they identified. To put it another way, they perceived stronger
correlations between many characteristics and sex than most people now
do, and saw biology rather than culture as the primary cause of differ-
ences between women and men. For example, they assumed that there
were natural and fundamental differences between women and men with
respect to reasoning capacity, physical stamina, and moral or spiritual
nature.
47
45. For a discussion of the cultural causes of sex differences in mathematics proficiency among
elementary and secondary school students, see J. BROOKs-GUNN & W. MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at
175-76, 246. On the causes of average sex differences in aggression, see infra note 172. For a discus-
sion of cultural factors that contribute to average differences between the sexes in longevity, see Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709-10 (1978). Data on the decreasing
gap between female and male athletic performance as a result of increased societal support for female
athletics also demonstrate the interaction between biological characteristics and cultural factors. For
discussions of physiological sex differences, cultural factors, and the impact of both on athletic per-
formance and potential, see Costill & Higdon, Women Runners: As "Human" as Men Despite Dif-
ferences, SCI. DIG., Mar. 1980, at 74; Wood, Sex Differences in Sports, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1980, §
6 (Magazine), at 30.
46. Since 1966, when the Johns Hopkins University Hospital and the University of Minnesota
started providing sex reassignment surgery previously unavailable in the United States, there have
been increasing numbers of persons born with the reproductive physiology of one sex who have ac-
quired through hormonal and surgical means some of the physiological characteristics of the opposite
sex. For a discussion of this phenomenon and legal responses to it, see Gould, Sex, Gender and the
Need for Legal Clarity: The Case of Transsexualism, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 423 (1979); see also Dun-
lap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1979) (arguing against notion that government should recognize two distinct sex
categories).
47. See supra p. 915. As additional examples of scholarly, political, and philosophical arguments
to this effect, see 2 C. DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 310-14
(1871) (men have greater mental powers and physical strength as result of natural selection, which
involves competition among males for sexual access to females; women have greater tenderness and
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By now, generalized biological determinism is largely discredited, al-
though it retains an uncanny political and social appeal.4 Popular and
educated opinion, however, remains divided about the nature and signifi-
cance of definitional differences-such as pregnancy-and of differ-
ences-such as the exclusion of women from combat, and the primary
responsibility of mothers for the care of infants-that might be termed
"quasi-definitional" because of their close historical and cultural connec-
tion to definitional differences.49 Therefore, although there seems to be a
broad consensus that many characteristics relevant to achievement-such
as intelligence and strength-can be found in both sexes, and that individ-
uals should be evaluated directly on the basis of these characteristics,
many sex-based rules are still widely perceived as appropriate. In addi-
tion, people continue to disagree about the extent to which the many im-
portant average differences between the sexes in careers, social roles, and
life patterns should be seen as both natural and morally neutral (or indeed
desirable), and to what extent they should be seen as evidence of
continued sex discrimination.
The general social debate about the continuing importance of biological
differences between the sexes has been mirrored in the Supreme Court by
disagreements about the meaning of equal rights in the context of the
equal protection clause and Title VII. Since the mid-1970's, the Court has
oscillated between two different approaches to legislative sex classifica-
tions, reflecting opposing views about the nature and significance of sex
differences. Both approaches recognize that sex classifications are some-
times used as inaccurate proxies for other characteristics with which chal-
lenged legislation is properly concerned, 50 and both reject laws based
less selfishness than men as a result of their maternal function); see also E. FIGES, PATRIARCHAL
ATTITUDES 113-20 (1970) (analyzing Darwin's views as part of historical account of attitudes toward
women since biblical times).
48. See G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 69, 70-71, 135-37 (1981) (arguing that men are
naturally irresponsible, hedonistic, and unproductive, and that women's biological mission is to civilize
men and provide incentives for them to become productive members of society); G. GILDER, SEXUAL
SUICIDE 14-25, 132-33, 194-204 (1973) (same).
49. Continuing social division about the extent to which social roles for women and men should
remain distinct, the desirability of drafting women on an equal basis with men, and the desirability of
equal roles for both parents in the care of young children was evident in the recent state legislative
debates concerning the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Stencel,
Equal Rights Fight, in EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: AGENDA FOR
THE EIGHTIES 177, 180-83 (1981). The amendment obtained 32 ratifications in the first two years
after it was approved by Congress, then obtained only three more ratifications between 1974 and
1977, see id. at 179, and none between 1977 and 1982, when its congressional mandate expired. On
the issue of child care roles, a national survey of American parents conducted in 1976 found that over
70% of American parents of both sexes believed that women with small children should not work
outside the home unless the money is really needed. See id. at 180.
50. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 280-81 (1979) (Brennan, J.).
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"upon archaic assumptions about the proper roles of the sexes."'51  The
two approaches differ, however, with respect to the amount of deference
given to legislative sex classifications that are in some sense "accurate,"
either because they reflect average differences that in fact do distinguish
the sexes as groups, or because they are thought to involve definitional or
quasi-definitional differences.
One position, articulated by Justice Brennan in the 1976 case of Craig
v. Boren,52 shared by Justice Marshall, 53 usually supported by Justice
White,5 "4 and recently joined by Justice O'Connor,55 requires a party de-
fending a sex-based classification to prove with clear evidence that the
classification is substantially related to an important government goal.56
This standard is often referred to as an "intermediate" level of scrutiny, to
distinguish it from the most deferential standard requiring only "minimal
rationality," and from true "strict scrutiny," requiring a showing that the
51. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring.)
52. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Justice Brennan has further elaborated this approach in Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 279-81 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 488 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497, 502 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Justice Marshall has joined all of Justice Brennan's sex discrimination opinions, including
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), and Craig, Orr, Goldfarb, and
Michael M. In addition, Justice Marshall has written several important sex discrimination opinions
in which Justice Brennan has joined. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 86 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 340 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Brennan, however, did not join Marshall's opinion in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542, 544 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
54. When laws explicitly based on sex have been at issue, Justice White has always voted the
same way as Justices Brennan and Marshall, and has usually joined their opinions, see, e.g., Craig,
Orr, Goldfarb, and Michael M., or has written opinions that they have joined, see Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 361 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting). In a few cases about sex classifications, however-notably those in which the government
has strongly argued a remedial justification-Justice White has taken care to indicate at least some
differences with Brennan and Marshall. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 521 (1975) (White,
J., dissenting); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 360 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). Sharp differences
exist between Justice White on the one hand, and Justices Brennan and Marshall on the other, with
respect to disproportionately burdensome neutral rules and pregnancy classifications: Justice White
generally votes to uphold such rules, and Justices Brennan and Marshall vote to invalidate them.
These differences are evident both in equal protection cases, see Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979) (upholding veterans preference rule); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding
rule not including pregnancy-related disability among covered disabilities in temporary state disability
program), and in Title VII cases, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 347 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting) (height and weight requirements for prison guards invalidated); General Elec. Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (upholding rule excluding pregnancy-related disability from otherwise com-
prehensive employer disability insurance plan).
55. Since her appointment, Justice O'Connor has voted (and written) in only one constitutional
case involving a sex classification, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), in
which she wrote a majority opinion applying the Craig standard. See infra pp. 957-58. O'Connor also
joined in part an opinion by Justice Marshall finding sex-based employee pension benefits prohibited
under Title VII. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3510-11 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
56. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-99.
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challenged law is "necessary" to further a "compelling" government inter-
est.57 Justices Brennan, Marshall and White appear to be particularly
concerned to guard both against the use of sex-based averages to justify
sex classifications when sex-neutral alternatives are available,58  and
against exaggerating the importance of definitional differences.59 To avoid
these dangers, defendants in sex discrimination cases have been required
to show that (1) the asserted goal is the rule's "actual" goal,60 (2) this
goal is important,61 (3) the challenged sex classification is a highly accu-
rate proxy for the characteristic said to distinguish women and men-such
as economic need 6 2 -and (4) a sex-neutral rule based directly on that
57. During the 1960's, the Court followed a "two-tier" model of equal protection doctrine. Classi-
fications based on race and national origin, and those impinging on "fundamental interests" such as
interstate travel, voting, and access to criminal appeals, were subjected to "strict scrutiny," which
required the government to show that the classification was "necessary" to a "compelling" state inter-
est. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). As applied by the Court, this level of review
was, in Professor Gunther's well-known phrase, "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra
note 43, at 8. Legislation not subjected to strict scrutiny was required only to be "rationally related"
to some legitimate government interest, yielding "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact." Id. In the early 1970's, the Court began developing an "intermediate" or "middle tier" ap-
proach that used the traditionally deferential vocabulary of rational relationship between means and
ends with greater "bite" or strictness. See id. at 20-37.
Laws imposing burdens on the basis of race are "immediately suspect," subject to "the most rigid
scrutiny," and can be justified only by "[p]ressing public necessity." Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (racial classifications
will be upheld only if "necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a per-
missible state policy"). In contrast to the requirement that racial classifications be "necessary" to the
accomplishment of a "permissible" or "pressing" public goal, the Craig standard requires sex classifi-
cations to be "substantially related" to an "important" government interest, 429 U.S. at 197; see also
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (explicitly contrasting
"strict scrutiny" applicable to racial classifications with "sharper focus" rationality test applicable to
sex classifications); Craig, 429 U.S. at 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing Craig standard as
"middle-tier" approach).
58. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 94 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Michael M. v. Supe-
rior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 490 n.2 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-83
(1979) (Brennan, J.).
59. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 365 (1979) (White, J., dissenting). Brennan and Marshall
also would treat laws based directly on definitional differences as sex classifications, and have argued
that such differences should not be exaggerated. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497, 501
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the views of Justices Brennan and Marshall in the Tide
VII context parallel those they have expressed in equal protection decisions. Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 345-46 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating
rejection of employer's claim that women's attractiveness as targets for sexual assault by male prison
inmates satisfies Title VII's bona-fide occupational qualification exception). Where classifications are
based directly on definitional differences or are analyzed in the context of Title VII, Justice White's
views are more similar to those of Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stewart. Thus, White joined the
majority opinion upholding the challenged pregnancy exclusion in Geduldig and wrote a separate
opinion in Dothard that was no more favorable to the plaintiff in its treatment of the challenged sex
classification than the majority opinion of Justice Stewart. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 347 (White, J.,
dissenting).
60. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 n.16 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (citing
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
61. Id. at 725 (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
62. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-52 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 217 (1977); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
360, 361-62 (White, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-89 (1973) (plurality
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characteristic would be less effective in achieving the government's goal."3
The second position, advocated by Justice Rehnquist"4 and, before his
retirement, by Justice Stewart, 5 and supported by Chief Justice Burger,6
requires a defendant to show only that a sex-based rule does not make
"overbroad generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to
any differences between men and women or which demean the ability or
social status of the affected class."'67 For Justices Rehnquist and Stewart,
the key question is whether women and men are "'different in fact' "68 in
the context of the law at issue. As Professor Earl Maltz has carefully
demonstrated, the reasons articulated by Justices Rehnquist and Stewart
for adopting this standard are somewhat different, and occasionally led
them to support different results.69 Justice Rehnquist takes the position
that laws he perceives as burdening men need only satisfy the minimal
rationality standard, because men have suffered from no history of dis-
crimination or disadvantage.7 ' Any showing that women and men are
opinion).
63. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 488 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 490
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 94 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281,
283 (1979); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Justice Rehnquist has elaborated his position in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 337 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result) (decided under Title VII); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224 (1977) (Rehnquist,,J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). His opinions applying Title VII to pregnancy classifications artic-
ulate a similar analysis. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
65. Justice Stewart joined Justice Rehnquist's sex-classification opinions in Rostker, Michael M.
(in which he also filed a concurring opinion, 450 U.S. at 476), and Goldfarb, as well as his pregnancy
classification opinions in Gilbert and Satty. In addition, Justice Stewart wrote major opinions on sex
classifications, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); pregnancy
classifications, Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); and
disproportionately burdensome neutral rules, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
66. After his somewhat opaque opinion for the Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
striking down Idaho's statutory preference for men over women as administrators of estates, Chief
Justice Burger has written little concerning sex discrimination. He has frequently joined the opinions
of Justice Rehnquist, e.g., Rostker, Michael M., Goldfarb, Gilbert, Satty, and Dothard, and of Jus-
tice Stewart, e.g., Geduldig and Feeney.
67. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.)
(quoting Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.)).
68. Id. at 469 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)). Interestingly, Justice Frank-
furter's opinion upholding Michigan's exclusion of women from the occupation of bartending quoted
the same phrase from Tigner. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). Goeseart itself has
been explicitly disapproved by a majority of the Court. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23
(1976).
69. Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 357,
379, 383-87 (1982). Compare Craig, 429 U.S. at 214 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (rule
permitting sale of 3.2% beer to females but not males ages 18-20 invalid because state has not proven
relevant differences between sexes) with id. at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (challenged rule satis-
fies rational basis test appropriate to rules discriminating against men).
70. Craig, 429 U.S. at 218-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Maltz, supra note 69, at 379.
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"different in fact" in relation to some legislative goal would then satisfy
this deferential standard of review. In adopting this position, Justice
Rehnquist explicitly rejects the argument that "all discriminations be-
tween the sexes ultimately redound to the detriment of females, because
they tend to reinforce 'old notions' restricting the roles and opportunities
of women."17 1 Justice Stewart, in contrast, was occasionally willing to in-
validate laws whose primary or immediate burden fell on men, if the
laws' lack of any relationship to "real" differences between women and
men suggested that they were actually based on traditional concepts of
appropriate sex roles.7 2 Despite these (and other) differences between
Rehnquist and Stewart, 3 however, the two Justices were usually in
agreement about the meaning and application of the "real differences"
standard. As Justice Stewart explained, laws that burden people on the
basis of race
always violate the Constitution, for the simple reason that, so far as
the Constitution is concerned, people of different races are always
similarly situated. . . By contrast, . . . detrimental gender classifi-
cations . . .do not always [violate the Constitution], for the reason
that there are differences between males and females that the Consti-
tution necessarily recognizes.7
4
Compared to the Brennan-Marshall approach, the Rehnquist-Stewart
approach is much more willing to accept the purpose asserted by the gov-
Justice Rehnquist apparently believes that the minimal rationality standard is applicable to laws bur-
dening women as well as to those burdening men. Rehnquist's general position appears to be that,
given the original intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, heightened judicial scrutiny
should apply only to "classifications based on race or on national origin, the first cousin of race."
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). From this perspective, other
classifications, including those based on sex, should be reviewed under the deferential "minimal ra-
tionality" standard. Although Justice Rehnquist has not explained why this is the appropriate stan-
dard to apply to laws burdening women, his separate opinions in fact apply a minimal rationality
standard. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
result) (arguing that Social Security Act's restriction of benefits to surviving mothers "does not ration-
ally serve any valid legislative purpose"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (adopting reasoning of lower court opinion, Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp.
201, 207 (M.D. Ala. 1972), which in turn applied the "rational basis" standard).
71. Craig, 459 U.S. at 220 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 214 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (invalidating Oklahoma law prohibit-
ing sale of 3.2% beer to males under age 21); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Stewart, J., joining
opinion of the Court by Brennan, J.); Maltz, supra note 69, at 383-87.
73. Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (Stewart, J.), discussed infra p. 934
with id. at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result).
74. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). Justice Stewart was perhaps moved to offer this explanation because in 1964, in a case
challenging criminal punishment for interracial sexual relations, he had stressed that he could not
"conceive of a valid legislative purpose ...which makes the color of a person's skin the test of
whether his conduct is a criminal offense." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), cited in Michael M., 450 U.S. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Sex Equality
ernment, 7  and much less prone to inquire into the relationship of the
perceived sex difference to the asserted legislative goal . 6 Moreover, the
Rehnquist-Stewart approach does not engage in the multifaceted consider-
ation of the validity of the factual premises underlying a challenged rule,
which characterizes the Brennan-Marshall approach. Instead, it empha-
sizes a single issue: whether the asserted difference between the sexes is
"real. 7
The decision about which of these approaches to adopt in a given case
rests effectively with the "swing" Justices-Blackmun, Powell, and Ste-
vens-who have not solidly committed themselves to either position, and
who bring their own perspectives to bear on the issues. Thus, Justice
Blackmun tends to accept government claims that the purpose of a sex-
based statute is to benefit women, and to discount both the symbolic costs
of such "benefits" to women and their burdensome impact on men.78 Jus-
tice Stevens often focuses on whether the sex classification resulted from a
careful consideration by the decisionmaker, as opposed to being an "acci-
dental by-product of a traditional way of thinking" about women.79 In a
manner somewhat similar to that of Rehnquist and Stewart, Stevens also
believes that legislation based on "natural" or biological sex differences is
less likely to be the product of traditional ways of thinking, and therefore
75. Compare Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-83 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (accepting govern-
ment's assertions that Congress found that, given-women's ineligibility for combat, military considera-
tions reduced need for both draft and registration of women) with id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting)
(Congress did not make findings asserted by government) and id. at 102-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Congress' findings concerned draft and registration of large numbers of women); Michael M., 450
U.S. at 469-72 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (accepting California's assertion that purpose of
statutory rape law was prevention of teenage pregnancy) with id. at 494-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(historical evidence shows protection of chastity of young females to be real statutory purpose). But
see Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result)
(rare example of Justice Rehnquist finding government's asserted purpose unpersuasive).
76. Compare Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-79 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (exclusion of
women from draft and draft registration justified by women's combat ineligibility) with id. at 93-95
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (evidence before Congress showed that despite combat ineligibility, women
could be registered on an equal basis with men and drafted as needed). The contrasting approaches in
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) are discussed infra p. 938.
77. See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78-79 (Rehnquist, J.); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464, 469, 471-73 (1981) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.); id. at 478-79 (Stewart, J., concurring);
Parham, 441 U.S. at 354-56 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).
78. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 404, 482-83 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 321 (1977) (Blackmun, J., joining Burger, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224 (1977) (Blackmun, J., joining
Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Maltz, supra note 69, at 393-95.
79. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see
also Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 154 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (holding provision of Missouri workers compensation law violative of equal protection
clause because it discriminated against widowers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S 57, 74 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J.) (relying on Stevens' concurrence in Goldfarb) (upholding constitutionality of Selective
Service Act, which authorizes registration of men but not women); Maltz, supra note 69, at 387-90.
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should be subjected to less stringent judicial review.8" Justice Powell ap-
parently applies to sex classifications something more than a minimum
rationality standard, but something less than Brennan and Marshall's ver-
sion of the Craig test.81 This has led him to a series of ad hoc judgments
about the importance of governmental goals justifying sex classifications.
82
In a number of constitutional cases involving sex classifications,8" as well
as one involving a neutral rule with a disparate impact on one sex 84 and
one involving a pregnancy classification,85 at least two of these Justices
voted with Rehnquist, Stewart, and Burger to uphold the challenged
rules.
The Justices' disagreements about employment discrimination law
under Title VII have generally paralleled their conflicts over equal pro-
tection doctrine. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination "because
of" an individual's sex,86 but permits employers to take sex into account
when sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification [bfoq] reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation" of the enterprise. 87  In the Supreme
Court's two opinions dealing with sex-based bfoqs-one written by Jus-
tice Stewart-the majority took the position that broadly defined differ-
ences between women and men were or might be relevant to job perform-
ance, 88 while Justices Brennan and Marshall insisted on the need for
careful scrutiny of sex classifications in a manner analogous to their ap-
80. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 497-98 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Maltz, supra note 69, at 387-90.
81. Justice Powell declined to join Justice Brennan's attempt to designate sex as a suspect classifi-
cation. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). He expressed "general agreement" with Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring), but then proceeded to interpret the Craig standard
somewhat differently than Justice Brennan, emphasizing whether the classification bears a "fair and
substantial relation" to a legitimate governmental objective, id. at 211, rather than whether it is "sub-
stantially related" to an "important" governmental objective, id. at 197.
82. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-94 (1979) (Powell, J.); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 359-61 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 735 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Maltz, supra note 69, at
390-93 (arguing that in cases not involving governmental benefit programs, Justice Powell finds dis-
crimination against men acceptable "so long as men are provided a means to remove any disability
under which they are placed," id. at 393).
83. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). The one exception was Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1979)
(per curiam), in which Justice Blackmun was the only swing Justice to associate himself with Bur-
ger's concurrence, id. at 321 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment). See infra note 194.
84. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
85. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
87. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
88. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (Stewart, J.) (female prison guard's "very
womanhood" would undermine her capacity to provide security-the essence of correctional coun-
selor's responsibility); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (existence of
conflicting family obligations may be more relevant to woman's job performance than to man's).
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proach under the Craig standard."9 Similar divisions have split the Court
in Title VII cases involving pregnancy classifications9" and disproportion-
ately burdensome neutral rules.91
III. The Rehnquist-Stewart Approach and the Concept of "Real" Sex
Differences
The concept of "real" sex differences is central to the Rehnquist-
Stewart approach. Under this approach, the legal problem of sex discrimi-
nation is generally conceived as the use of sex classifications when no
"real" differences between women and men are involved. "Real" differ-
ences are defined broadly to include definitional differences, legally cre-
ated differences, and differences that result from past discrimination
against women. In cases involving "real" differences, review of the rela-
tionship between the classification and the goal is deferential. This ap-
proach is also associated with a high degree of tolerance for facially sex-
neutral rules that have a disparate impact on one sex.
A. Definitional Differences
For Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, the clearest examples of "real"
differences between the sexes are those termed "definitional," that is,
those involving the distinctive reproductive and sexual characteristics that
define membership in a given sex. But in what sense, or for what reasons,
do Rehnquist and Stewart take these differences to be "real?"
Consider, for example, Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in
Michael M. v. Superior Court.92 In this case, a seventeen year old boy
had sexual intercourse with a sixteen year old girl, and was prosecuted
under California's statutory rape law, which penalizes males for sexual
intercourse with females under eighteen.9 3 Rehnquist accepted the state's
dubious characterization of the statute's purpose as the prevention of teen-
age pregnancy. 94 Under Rehnquist's approach, the key question then be-
89. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 343-46 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ac-
cepting majority's ruling concerning neutral rules with disparate impact on women, but rejecting
conclusion that sex was bfoq for contact guard positions in Alabama's male maximum security pris-
ons). Phillips was a per curiam decision in which Justice Marshall alone wrote a separate opinion
rejecting the majority's apparently broad interpretation of the bfoq exception to Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination. 400 U.S. at 545-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
90. Compare General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) (upholding rule
excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from otherwise comprehensive employer disability plan) with
id. at 146-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exclusion discriminatorily motivated; also invalid as classifica-
tion with discriminatory effect).
91. See infra p. 934.
92. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
93. Id. at 466.
94. Id. at 469-73. On the lack of evidence that prevention of pregnancy was in fact that statute's
purpose, see id. at 494-96 (Brennan, J. dissenting); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608,
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came whether women and men were "different in fact" or "similarly situ-
ated" with respect to this purpose.95 In finding that young women were
not "similarly situated" to young men "with respect to the problems and
the risks of sexual intercourse," '96 Rehnquist focused on two issues: the
biological or natural origins of definitional differences, and the extent of
overlap between the sexes with respect to these differences. He found that
it is a "natural" 97 or "physiological"98 fact that only women can become
pregnant, and that, as a result, there is no overlap between the sexes as to
this characteristic.99
He then applied a deferential standard of review. He argued that since
the threat of pregnancy was a "natural" deterrent to sexual intercourse
for young women, it was reasonable for the legislature to impose criminal
penalties only on men, and thereby "equalize" the deterrent for both
sexes.'0 0 As Justices Brennan and Stevens forcefully pointed out in sepa-
rate dissents, this reasoning involved little review of the relationship be-
tween the classification and the goal.' The state presented no evidence to
show that the threat of pregnancy in fact deterred young women's sexual
activity, and indeed the available evidence suggested that it did not have
this effect.'0 2 A much more plausible explanation for the state's choice to
penalize only males for sexual intercourse involving teenage girls was the
assumption that when such conduct occurs, males are the aggressors and
females are their victims."' 3 This explanation of the statute is supported
not only by historical evidence about the origins of the law in the nine-
teenth century'04 but also by contemporary evidence about the kinds of
617-621, 601 P.2d 572, 578-80, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 346-48 (1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting), af'd, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion). See generally Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections
on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 179-88 (1982) (analyzing statutory
rape laws in general and Rehnquist's opinion in particular).
95. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 471.
97. Id. at 473.
98. Id. at 467.
99. Id. at 471.
100. Id. at 473.
101. Id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 496-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. See Williams, supra note 94.
104. As Justice Brennan suggested, 450 U.S. at 494-96 & nn. 9-10, the statute appears originally
to have been premised on the legal incapacity of females below a certain age to give valid consent,
with the result that all intercourse with females below that age was presumed to be nonconsensual.
Before Michael M. was litigated, the California courts consistently stated the law's purpose in terms
of protecting the virtue of young and unsophisticated girls either from "violation" by young men or
from the young women's own poor judgment; see also Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d 608, 612, 601 P.2d
572, 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (1979) (males "are the only persons who may physiologically cause
the result which the law properly seeks to avoid"), afl'd, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
This statement was quoted both by the plurality in the Supreme Court, 450 U.S. at 467, and by
Justice Stevens in dissent, 450 U.S. at 500 n.7.
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situations in which the law is enforced.10 5 By substituting conclusory no-
tions of "common sense" about biological differences between the sexes for
factual analysis of the challenged classification and the rationale for its
use, Justice Rehnquist was able to disregard the overbroad stereotype
about the sexes reflected in California's statutory rape law.
The Rehnquist-Stewart conception of real sex differences also played a
central role in three cases involving explicit pregnancy classifications. As
in Michael M., in these three cases Rehnquist and Stewart took the posi-
tion that sex discrimination can occur only when women and men are
similarly situated, that is, when they share a characteristic that is impli-
cated in the challenged rule.108 The absence of overlap between the sexes,
particularly with respect to a biological characteristic, establishes the exis-
tence of a "real" sex difference that easily justifies differential treatment.
This reasoning led Rehnquist and Stewart to conclude that pregnancy
classifications are not sex classifications at all, but simply "neutral rules"
concerning an "objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics" that happens to be limited to one sex. 107 Thus, defendants
need only show a minimally rational relationship between the rule and its
asserted goal.108 Under this standard, the Court approved state and em-
ployer temporary disability plans that excluded benefits for pregnancy,
even though the plans provided benefits for other disabilities that were
comparable to pregnancy because they were unrelated to disease, some-
times voluntarily assumed, costly to insure against, and limited to one
sex.
1 0 9
105. The state of California argued that the statute was "commonly employed in situations in-
volving force, prostitution, pornography or coercion due to status relationships." Michael M., 450
U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 135 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
107. Nashville Gas Co., 434 U.S. at 141-43; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496
n.20.
108. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495-96. In Gilbert, Rehnquist found that the pregnancy exclusion was
neither a facial sex classification nor a neutral rule with a disparate impact. Since it was thus entirely
outside the scope of Title VII's coverage, no employer justification was required. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at
135-40. But see Nashville Gas Co., 434 U.S. at 140-43 (seniority system that allowed both male and
female employees to retain accumulated seniority while on leave for non-occupational disabilities other
than pregnancy but divested seniority if an employee took leave for any other reason, including preg-
nancy, invalid as unjustified by business necessity; though facially sex neutral, challenged rule had
disparate impact on women in that denial of accumulated seniority imposed on women substantial
burden that men need not suffer).
109. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 152 & n.5, 155, 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Geduldig, 417 U.S.
at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The fact that pregnancy is not a disease and is often voluntarily
undertaken and desired was mentioned by Justice Rehnquist in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136, after he
quoted Justice Stewart's characterization of pregnancy as an objectively identifiable physical condition
with unique characteristics, id. at 134 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20). Both Justice Stewart
in Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 493-94, 496 n.20, and Justice Rehnquist in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 131, 136,
noted that pregnancy was unique to women, and that it was expensive to insure against.
The Yale Law Journal
The Title VII case of Dothard v. Rawlinson"0 suggests how the
Rehnquist-Stewart concept of real sex differences can be extended beyond
differences that are clearly definitional to include more controversial
claims about human behavior. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in
Dothard also illustrates the Court's tendency to give more deferential re-
view to rules based on what it perceives to be definitional sex differences
than to rules based on characteristics shared by both sexes. The Dothard
case involved challenges to two Alabama rules that restricted women's em-
ployment as prison guards. The first rule did not explicitly exclude
women but established minimum height and weight requirements that
rendered a disproportionate number of women ineligible for employ-
ment."11 Under the established interpretation of Title VII, such an exclu-
sionary effect is considered discrimination "because of" sex unless the em-
ployer can show that the rule has "a manifest relationship" to job
performance.11 2 The state argued that the height and weight standards
were necessary to ensure that guards would be strong enough to maintain
prison security. 1  Justice Stewart held, however, that to prevail this argu-
ment had to be documented in two ways. First, the state would have to
demonstrate that a particular level of strength was needed to maintain
prison security, and that the height and weight standards were accurately
correlated with that degree of strength.'1 4 Second, the state would have to
show that a less discriminatory (and more functional) selection method
that measured strength directly was not feasible. 1 5 Since the state had
offered no evidence as to either of these matters, the height and weight
standards were found to be prohibited sex discrimination.
The second rule at issue in Dothard, adopted by the state during the
course of litigation against the height and weight standards, explicitly ex-
cluded women from all guard positions that required contact with inmates
in men's maximum security prisons." 6 The state argued that sex was a
"bona fide occupational qualification" because of the danger that male
inmates might sexually assault female guards."' Although the established
Title VII standard for validating such claims is at least as strict as the
standard applicable to disproportionately burdensome neutral rules, 8
110. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
111. Id. at 329-30.
112. Id. at 329 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
113. Id. at 331. Defendants actually referred to job performance in general, but it is apparent
from the context of their argument that maintaining prison security was the relevant aspect of the job.
Id. at 339 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result and concurring in part).
114. Id. at 331 (majority opinion).
115. Id. at 332.
116. Id. at 325 n.6 (quoting Regulation 204).
117. Id. at 334-35.
118. Justice Stewart quoted with apparent approval two lower court formulations of the "bona
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Justice Stewart applied it in a much more lenient fashion.
In contrast to his approach to the state's claim about the height and
weight rules, Justice Stewart readily accepted the state's assertion that the
use of women guards would increase prison security problems. 19 In par-
ticular, he did not require the state to show that in the "barbaric and
inhumane"12 conditions prevailing in the Alabama prisons, in which
male guards were frequently attacked, women guards would be assaulted
because they were women, rather than because they were guards. 21 Most
fide occupational qualification" (bfoq) exception: that articulated in Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways,
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) ("discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively") and that
articulated by the same court in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969) (employer can rely on bfoq exception only by proving "that he had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved"). Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333. Stewart also referred
to the Court's own prior decision in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), and
cited a series of lower court opinions for the proposition that "the federal courts have agreed that it is
impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of stereo-
typed characterizations of the sexes." Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (footnote omitted). He went on to say
that the majority was persuaded "by the restrictive language of § 703(e), the relevant legislative his-
tory, and the consistent interpretation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-that the
bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 334 (footnotes omitted). On the basis of this discussion, it
seems that the bfoq exception shares with the Craig test a rejection of stereotyped characterizations of
the sexes and a requirement that sex classifications be justified on the basis of factually demonstrable
differences between the sexes in relation to important employment functions. The view that the stan-
dard of review under the bfoq exception is at least as strong as the equal protection standard is
reinforced by a somewhat puzzling footnote to Stewart's opinion in Dothard, which notes that since a
state employer is involved, the bfoq exception must be interpreted "at the very least so as to conform
to the Equal Protection Clause... ." Id. at 334 n.20. Because none of the parties suggested that the
equal protection clause requires more rigorous scrutiny than Title VII, Stewart concluded that there
was "thus no occasion to give independent consideration to the District Court's ruling that Regulation
204 violates the Fourteenth Amendment as well as Tide VII." Id. at 334 n.20.
119. 433 U.S. at 335-36. As Justice Marshall noted, "the record shows that the presence of
women guards has not led to a single incident amounting to a serious breach of security in any
Alabama institution." Id. at 344 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The two
incidents involving potentially dangerous assaults on women in prisons on which the majority and the
state of Alabama relied did not involve corrections officers, but rather a clerical worker and a student
visiting on a tour. Id. at 344 n.3.
120. See id. at 342.
121. As Justice Marshall pointed out:
The particular severity of discipline problems in the Alabama maximum-security prisons is
also no justification for the discrimination sanctioned by the Court. The District Court found
in Pugh v. Locke that guards "must spend all their time attempting to maintain control or to
protect themselves." If male guards face an impossible situation, it is difficult to see how
women could make the problem worse, unless one relies on precisely the type of generalized
bias against women that the Court agrees Title VII was intended to outlaw ....
The Court points to no evidence in the record to support the asserted "likelihood that in-
mates would assault a woman because she was a woman." Perhaps the Court relies upon
common sense, or "innate recognition." But the danger in this emotionally laden context is that
common sense will be used to mask the "romantic paternalism" and persisting discriminatory
attitudes that the Court properly eschews. To me, the only matter of innate recognition is that
the incidence of sexually motivated attacks on guards will be minute compared to the "likeli-
hood that inmates will assault" a guard because he or she is a guard.
Id. at 343, 345-46 (citations omitted).
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importantly, the record was clear that the state had a less discriminatory
way of reducing the risk of assaults on all guards, including sexual as-
saults, than by refusing to hire women. It could staff and administer its
prisons in accordance with minimum professional (and constitutional)
standards.122 Indeed, Alabama was under federal court order to do exactly
that, and was planning to hire large numbers of additional guards as well
as to make other changes in prison conditions. By upholding the males-
only hiring rule, the Court ironically perpetuated the state's policy at the
very moment that this policy was about to lose its asserted justification,
and thereby excluded women from substantial employment
opportunities. 
123
The reason for the application of different standards of review to the
two challenged rules appears to be the belief, expressed in Justice Stew-
art's opinion, that male preference for women as the targets for sexual
assault reflects a "real" difference between the sexes. Thus, the argument
goes, unlike average differences in height, weight, and strength, as to
which there is substantial overlap between the sexes, there is no overlap
between the sexes as to the characteristics involved in sexual assault. In-
stead, Justice Stewart described the relevant characteristic-sexual attrac-
tiveness to men-as inherent in womanhood,124 and saw that characteris-
tic as one possessed by all women and no men. Thus, individual
evaluation was irrelevant, and a sex-based rule was appropriate.
Justice Stewart's way of thinking about the causes of male sexual as-
sault on women seems reasonable at first glance. People commonly think
of sexual assaults as different from other kinds of assaults, and as caused
in part by the very existence of biological sex differences. The apparent
plausibility of this way of thinking, however, obscures three important
questions. The first is whether male sexual assaults on female guards
should be viewed primarily as a biological or a cultural phenomenon. Jus-
tice Stewart chose to emphasize biology, and did so without acknowledg-
ing the likely importance of cultural factors. But whatever the role of biol-
ogy as a source of sexual attraction between women and men, the extent
of male sexual assault on women is determined by culture.'2 5 Indeed, the
122. The majority's acceptance of the unconstitutional conditions existing in the Alabama prisons
as a justification for the exclusion of women conflicted with the language of the bfoq exception, which
requires that the sex classification be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the enterprise.
As Justice Marshall pointed out, by ruling that being male was a bfoq for the jobs at issue, the
majority was in effect holding that the unconstitutional conditions were part of the normal operation
of the prison. Id. at 342.
123. Id. at 345 n.4.
124. Id. at 336 (Stewart, J.).
125. See M. MEAD, MALE AND FEMALE 201-07 (1949) (cultural variations among different soci-
eties in patterns of sexual interaction, including frequency of rape; rape as a form of deviance that
may develop under a variety of special social conditions); cf. Weisstein, Tired of Arguing About Bio-
936
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record in the Dothard case itself demonstrated that competently adminis-
tered and staffed prisons in other states had employed female guards in
contact positions in men's prisons without difficulty.126 If male sexual as-
sault on female guards were a matter of "nature," such a change would
have been impossible, or at least much more difficult to achieve. Stewart's
apparent dismissal of this evidence suggests that, for him, unreflective
"common sense" ideas about "real" differences between women and men
outweigh actual evidence about the possibility of changing traditional sex
roles and their associated behavior patterns.
A second question raised by Dothard is whether there are good reasons
to treat sexual assaults and non-sexual assaults as two separate problems.
In analyzing this qdestion, one should consider that both types of assault
present serious problems for prison security and that both are methods for
inmates to express hostility toward guards. In addition, the physical and
emotional harms of non-sexual and sexual assaults are not wholly distinct.
Finally, the incidence of both types of assault can be reduced by improve-
ments in prison security. The fact that some sexual assaults involve defini-
tional differences between the sexes in their reproductive anatomy has no
necessary relevance either to the problems such assaults present or to the
measures necessary to discourage and punish such acts of aggression. Be-
cause of his focus on "real" differences, Justice Stewart failed to ask
whether the state had adequately justified its decision to single out for
remedy the one type of assault that affected women only.127
A third, related question raised by Dothard is the following: Even if
female guards are uniquely subject to sexual assaults, should this problem
be remedied by improving prison conditions or by excluding women from
employment? For Justice Stewart and a majority of the Court, once the
allegedly biological basis of the problem of sexual assaults was identified,
logical Inferiority?: The Truth About Sociobiology, MS., Nov. 1982, at 41, 45 (recent scholarship
about non-human primates reveals wide variations in patterns of male-female interaction between and
within species; rape is virtually unknown except among young orangutans).
126. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 341 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting amicus briefs filed by states of California and Washington). The district
court noted that Alabama was already employing women in contact positions at other all-male institu-
tions. See Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1184 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (three-judge panel) (per
curiam), afld in part and rev'd in part, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
127. If sexual and other physical assaults were grouped together for purposes of analysis, it seems
likely that women would experience a greater average frequency of assaults than men. It also seems
likely, however, that there would be substantial overlap between the sexes in assault rates, and that
factors other than sex-skills in interpersonal relationships and knowledge of self-defense techniques,
for example-would also be shown to be correlated with individual differentials. Once assaults of both
types were considered as a single problem, it would be the state's burden to justify using an overbroad
and under-inclusive sex classification, rather than using sex-neutral factors, to exclude particularly
vulnerable individuals from guard positions requiring contact with inmates. It seems unlikely that
average differences between the sexes would be so great that the state could meet this burden. See
supra p. 934 (discussing challenge to height and weight rule).
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the question of how to resolve the problem became a matter for the prison
administrators to decide. To put it another way, the finding that the chal-
lenged rule involved "real" differences between the sexes eliminated the
possibility that the state engaged in sex discrimination when it decided to
exclude women guards rather than eliminate the unconstitutional condi-
tions in the prison.
B. Legally Created Differences
Other cases suggest that the concept of "real" differences espoused by
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart includes not only differences perceived as
definitional, but some legally and socially created differences as well. In
Parham v. Hughes,2 ' the Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice
Stewart,1"9 upheld a Georgia law that precluded an unwed father from
suing for the wrongful death of his child unless he had previously legiti-
mated that child. Stewart accepted the state's argument that this sex clas-
sification was justified as a means of encouraging unwed fathers to legiti-
mate their children-under state law, only fathers had this power ' 3 0-and
as a means of avoiding multiple lawsuits by men falsely claiming to be the
fathers of deceased children born out of wedlock."' 1 The majority gave a
great deal of deference to the unsubstantiated judgments of the Georgia
legislature. Indeed, the state of Georgia presented no evidence to support
most of the factual propositions underlying its legal arguments. For exam-
ple, the state did not show that there was a high percentage of cases in
which the identity of the father of a child born out of wedlock was in fact
difficult to ascertain,"3 2 that the denial of wrongful death recovery en-
couraged fathers who had not legitimated their children to do so, 133 that
legitimation was strongly related to the assumption of paternal responsi-
bilities, 134  or that multiple wrongful death actions were a significant
problem." 5
128. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
129. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, on the grounds that the gender-based distinction
in wrongful death recovery was "substantially related to achievement of the important state objective
of avoiding difficult problems in proving paternity after the death of an illegitimate child." Id. at 359-
60 (Powell, J., concurring). In reaching this conclusion he relied on the facts that it was entirely
within the father's power to remove the disability, that the procedure was simple and convenient, and
that the requirement of action before the child's death made it more likely that both the mother and
the child would be available to provide evidence. Id. at 360 ("The marginally greater burden placed
upon fathers is no more severe than is required by the marked difference between proving paternity
and proving maternity-a difference we have recognized repeatedly.").
130. Id. at 353 (Stewart, J.).
131. Id. at 357.
132. Id. at 364-65 (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 362-63.
134. Id. at 366-68.
135. Id. at 365-66.
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Two other cases, Schlesinger v. Ballard136 and Rostker v. Goldberg,13
share with Parham the notion that one sex-based law can create real dif-
ferences between women and men on which the same legislature can rely
to justify a second sex-based statute. Both involved challenges by men to
sex-based laws that the government claimed were justified by the statutory
exclusion of women from military combat positions. In Ballard, Justice
Stewart, writing for a five Justice majority, upheld a rule that gave female
naval officers who were passed over for promotion the opportunity to re-
main in the service for a longer period than similarly situated male of-
ficers on the grounds that this rule compensated women for the lesser pro-
motion opportunities that resulted from their statutory exclusion from
both combat and sea duty."3 In Rostker, Justice Rehnquist, on behalf of
a six Justice majority, upheld the exemption of women from draft regis-
tration on the grounds that women and men were differently situated be-
cause women were excluded from combat.139 Rehnquist then deferred to
Congress' determination that, because of the combat exclusion, registering
women was undesirable.
14 0
The majority's acceptance, in these three cases, of legally created differ-
ences as a basis for other sex-based laws seems inconsistent with any seri-
ous commitment to eliminating sex discrimination. If legislatures can cre-
ate "real" sex differences at will by passing sex-based laws, the equal
protection clause can easily be circumvented. One alternative is to seek
other explanations for the majority's holdings. It is arguable that all three
cases are examples of sex-based laws thought to be related in some rela-
tively imprecise way to definitional differences. Parham is most easily ac-
counted for in this way. Indeed, there are indications in other cases that
some Justices believe that average differences between unwed mothers and
unwed fathers in their willingness to assume parental responsibilities to-
ward their natural children derive from women's direct involvement in
pregnancy and childbirth, and not from sex-based cultural patterns.141 It
is also possible that the combat exclusion is thought to be in some way
related to biological, or at least fundamental, differences between women
and men, perhaps having to do with motherhood or with men's "natural"
aggressiveness.' 42 Seen in this light, all three cases are examples of lax
136. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
137. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
138. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508.
139. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78.
140. Id. at 79.
141. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 404-07
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. See Registration of Women: Hearings on H.R. 6569 Before the Military Personnel Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1980) (Rep. Richard
White) ("No capability exists to determine which women could meet the physical demands of the
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judicial review of assertions that challenged sex classifications are justified
because of definitional or biological differences between women and men.
It is striking, however, that the opinions themselves place primary empha-
sis on the "real" legally-created differences between women's and men's
situations, and refer only secondarily to possible justifications for the legis-
latures' creation of those differences. 14 3 Thus, all three decisions signifi-
cantly dilute the concept of "real" differences.
C. Remedial Classifications
The final category consists of cases that uphold sex classifications as
remedies for prior discrimination against women.144 In the first and most
striking of these decisions, Kahn v. Shevin,' 45 Justice Douglas, writing for
a six Justice majority,1 46 upheld an 1885 Florida law granting widows a
limited exemption from property taxes. Both the wording of the statute
and the historical period in which it was enacted 14 7 suggest that the Flor-
ida legislature assumed that all widows, regardless of their actual wealth,
had been economically dependent on their husbands and deserved special
protection from tax liability. The state defended the law, however, as "an
affirmative step toward alleviating the effects of past economic discrimina-
tion against women.' 48 Justice Douglas accepted this argument in sweep-
ing terms, explaining: "Whether from overt discrimination or from the
socialization process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhos-
combat environment. . . .[Women in combat] could seriously affect our national security."); id. at 3
(statement of Alabama housewife endorsed by Rep. Marjorie Holt) ("I think the majority of Ameri-
can girls. . . are unfit both physically and emotionally to serve in the Armed Forces. . . .[T]he use
of females, even in some of the positions they already fill, will greatly weaken the effectiveness of any
combat unit."). Other witnesses before the subcommittee also made statements about the incompatibil-
ity of military service and women's nature or mission in life. For example, Phyllis Schlafly, of the
Coalition Against Drafting Women, stated,
[Miembers of the armed forces are taught to kill and to be brutal and victorious in combat
with potential enemies . . . . Women's mission is to participate in the creation of life, not in
destroying it. We expect our servicemen to be tough enough to defend us against any en-
emy-and we want our women to be feminine and human enough to transform our servicemen
into good husbands, fathers, and citizens upon their return from battle.
Id. at 106.
143. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76-81; Parham, 441 U.S. at 357-358; Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508-510.
144. The Court has upheld sex-based laws on remedial grounds on three occasions: Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), discussed supra p. 939; and
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam), discussed infra note 194. Webster is the only
case in which both the Rehnquist-Stewart and the Brennan-Marshall approaches led to the upholding
of a sex-based law on remedial grounds, albeit on the basis of different reasoning. See 430 U.S. at 313
(per curiam); id. at 321 (Burger, C.J., joined by Stewart, Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in
the judgment).
145. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
146. He was joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.
147. See Kahn, 416 U.S. at 352 & n.2.
148. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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pitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs."' 49 Douglas
then cited data showing that the median income of working women was
less than sixty percent of the male median, 50 and commented:
The disparity is likely to be exacerbated for the widow. While the
widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded his
spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly
forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which,
because of her former economic dependency, she will have fewer
skills to offer.'
151
Justice Douglas' recognition that socialization patterns and pervasive
discrimination impose economic disadvantages on many women was not
incorrect. What is interesting is why this perception justified the creation
of a broadly framed, permanent, and separate legal status for all widows
regardless of their actual experiences with sex discrimination.152 There
seem to be two related explanations for Douglas' willingness to see the
law as remedial rather than as a reflection of archaic stereotypes about
women. One is that he was less concerned with discrimination against
men, such as that resulting from the statute involved in Kahn, than with
discrimination against women. Indeed, several Justices have suggested
that sex-based classifications that adversely affect men should be subjected
to more deferential review than those that affect women.153 Subsequent
cases in which remedial justifications were rejected are consistent with this
analysis, since these cases arguably involved discrimination against women
wage earners as well as against their male dependents.1
54
A second explanation is that Justice Douglas saw the asserted differ-
ence between most widows and widowers as "real" in the sense that sex
discrimination in employment is a problem that affects women because
they are women. Under this analysis, legislative classifications based on
prior discrimination against women differ from legislative classifications
based on average differences between the sexes in two ways. First, prior
experience of discrimination based on being female is a characteristic pos-
sessed only by women. In contrast, average differences involve characteris-
tics possessed by members of both sexes. Second, the characteristic in
149. Id. at 353 (Douglas, J.).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 354.
152. See Williams, supra note 94, at 180 n.35.
153. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217, 219 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 239, 242 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (urging rejection of challenge by man to Social Security Act provision
perceived as benefiting women).
154. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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question-being a victim of sex discrimination-is a characteristic one ac-
quires solely as a result of one's sex. Under this view, Douglas' use of a
deferential standard of review to evaluate the statutory means-ends rela-
tionship in Kahn was justified because the sex classification was based on
a "real" difference between women and men-something that happens
only to women, and happens to them solely because of their sex.1"5
Douglas' opinion thus turns an important insight about the unfairness
and pervasiveness of sex classifications into a justification for their contin-
ued use. As with the other cases in which a majority of the Justices have
been persuaded that there are "real" differences between women and
men, the search for ways in which women and men are not similarly
situated becomes a substitute for a careful analysis of the challenged legis-
lation and obscures a number of troubling issues' 56
D. Neutral Rules with a Disparate Impact on One Sex
In general, the manner in which Justices Rehnquist and Stewart ana-
lyze neutral rules that have a disparate impact on one sex is consistent
with their limited notion of sex discrimination. They generally emphasize
the appropriateness of judicial deference to legislative determinations that
a particular characteristic is relevant to the legislature's purpose.157 In
their view, the problem of sex discrimination arises only when a legisla-
ture uses sex as a proxy for a characteristic shared by both sexes.15 Rules
based directly on a characteristic other than sex, by definition, do not pre-
sent this problem, because rather than using an inaccurate sex classifica-
tion, they classify directly on the basis of the characteristic thought to be
relevant by the legislature. Therefore, such rules carry the presumption of
validity that attaches to most legislative classifications. In order to over-
come this presumption, a challenger carries a heavy burden of proof, and
must show that the decisionmaker actively desired the disproportionate
155. See Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (interpreting Kahn in this
manner).
156. These issues include the morality of giving a benefit to all individuals based on a characteris-
tic that only some of them share; the symbolic and practical implications of permitting any broadly-
framed, permanent differential treatment based on sex, particularly in light of the long history of
confusion between protection of women (or other sex-based benefits) and discrimination against them;
and the patent irrationality of the challenged statute as a means to the asserted legislative goal.
157. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion of
Rehnquist, J.) (accepting state contention that female capacity to become pregnant is related to state's
asserted purpose of deterring teenage pregnancy by punishing sexual intercourse with females under
age 18); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 81-82 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (accepting government's
assertion that women's ineligiblity for combat is related to administrative difficulties and loss of mili-
tary flexibility that would result if even small numbers of women were drafted).
158. See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471; Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1979)
(plurality opinion of Stewart, J.); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (Stewart, J.).
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impact of the rule.159
For example, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,16 women were ef-
fectively excluded from desirable state employment because of an absolute
veterans' preference rule that favored veterans with minimally passing
scores on the state civil service examination over higher-scoring
non-veterans.16' The lack of women veterans was in turn caused by the
virtual exclusion of women from the military as a matter of federal law,
16 2
as well as by strong cultural beliefs about appropriate sex roles, which
discouraged women from volunteering for military service.' 63 Moreover,
the rule directly reinforced traditional sex-based hierarchy by reserving
managerial positions for men, while permitting women to fill traditionally
female subordinate positions.1 64 Nonetheless, the majority concluded that
the foreseeability of these results was not sufficient to establish discrimina-
tory intent. In the absence of proof that the Massachusetts legislature de-
sired to disadvantage women,16 5 the veterans' preference was upheld as a
rational means to the legitimate end of encouraging military service, a
means that just "happened" to burden women disproportionately.' 66
IV. A Critique of the Concept of "Real" Sex Differences
The attempt by Justices Rehnquist and Stewart to construct a jurispru-
dence of sex discrimination around the concept of "real" sex differences
represents a small concession to the modern women's movement and the
significant social changes of which it is a part. The concession offered by
the Rehnquist-Stewart position is that sex-based legislation is no longer
conclusively presumed to be valid. A challenger may now argue, with at
least a small likelihood of success, that asserted sex differences are not
actually correlated with sex, and hence cannot justify a sex-based classifi-
cation. As a practical matter, Justice Rehnquist has been persuaded by
159. See supra p. 934 (describing Title VII standard for review of disproportionately burdensome
neutral rules, which is considerably more favorable to challengers).
160. 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (Stewart, J.).
161. Id. at 271.
162. Id. at 269-70.
163. Helen Feeney, the state employee who brought suit against Massachusetts' absolute veterans'
preference rule, apparently considered joining the military in the early years of World War II:
I was informed by the recruiters that programs for women were very limited and that there
were more rigorous physical requirements for females as opposed to males. . . . I was over 18
years of age at the time, but I was also informed that, since I was a female, I had to obtain
parental consent. My mother (my father was deceased) refused to give me the required permis-
sion, stating to me that the general reputation of the type of female who joined the military
was not good.
App. at 180, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); see supra note 142.
164. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 270-71.
165. Id. at 270-71, 276, 278-80.
166. Id. at 279 n.2 5 (impact on women "is essentially an unavoidable consequence of a legislative
policy that has in itself always been deemed to be legitimate").
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this argument only when the government or employer made virtually no
effort to defend a sex classification in terms of legitimate goals, 167 and
Justice Stewart was only slightly more willing to invalidate challenged
sex-based rules.1"' To this small extent, the Rehnquist-Stewart position
represents an advance over the Court's pre-1970 acceptance of traditional
sex-based legislation.
Nevertheless, this approach is subject to three major criticisms. The
first concerns the broad way it defines the concept of "real" sex differ-
ences. The second is that the concept of "real" sex differences, even if
limited to definitional differences between the sexes, embodies important
misconceptions about the relationship between biological sex differences
and cultural arrangements. The third is that the approach minimizes the
extent to which disproportionately burdensome neutral rules promote so-
cial patterns that support the continued subordination of women.
As to the first of these criticisms, Justices Rehnquist and Stewart have
stretched the concept of "real" sex differences beyond its breaking point.
Although the language of their opinions often suggests that "real" differ-
ences are those of "natural" or "biological" origin,169 it is clear from the
cases discussed above, notably Rostker, Parham, and Dothard, that they
are willing to include cultural behavior patterns and even legislation as
sources of "real" differences. 170 Defined as broadly as it is, the concept
provides no coherent basis for distinguishing between the differences it
describes as "real" and those it excludes from this category. Indeed, the
paradoxical-although hardly surprising-result of the Rehnquist-Stew-
167. Justice Rehnquist has voted to strike down two sex-based rules: a Louisiana law permitting
a husband to dispose of jointly owned marital property without his wife's consent, Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 463 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., joining Stewart, J., concurring in the result), and
a Social Security Act provision granting survivor's benefits to mothers but not fathers caring for chil-
dren of deceased wage-earners, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the result). In Kirchberg, the state itself declined to appeal an adverse ruling by the
Court of Appeals, thereby "apparently abandon[ing] any claim that an important government objec-
tive was served by the statute." 450 U.S. at 461 (Marshall, J.). In Wiesenfeld, the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare did attempt to defend the statute as a measure designed to compensate
women "for the economic difficulties which still confront women who seek to support themselves and
their families." 420 U.S. at 648 (majority opinion). Tfiis argument, however, was inconsistent with
the structure of the statute and its legislative history, which established the provision's purpose as
enabling women "to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care of children." Id. Since the
government's asserted purpose was "so totally at odds with the content and history" of the statute,
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "it cannot serve as a basis for judging whether the statutory distinc-
tion between men and women rationally serves a valid legislative objective." Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the result); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 337 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in pertinent part) (affirming district court judgment that requirements for prison guards
violated Title VII on grounds of "the peculiarly limited factual and legal justifications" offered by the
state).
168. See supra pp. 927-28.
169. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 US. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
170. See supra pp. 938-42.
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art position has been to uphold those views about sex differences that are
most entrenched in cultural beliefs and legislation, which in turn pose the
greatest dangers of stereotyping and subordination of women. 7-
The second, more fundamental, criticism of the Rehnquist-Stewart ap-
proach attacks not only the excessively broad notion of real sex differ-
ences, but also the very concept of "real" sex differences. The adjective
"real" implies not only that these differences are caused by nature or biol-
ogy, but also that the impact of sex differences on people's lives is natural
and inevitable, rather than culturally determined. By stressing the alleg-
edly biological basis of certain sex differences, and by refusing to examine
closely the ways in which governments and employers give those differ-
ences significance, the Rehnquist-Stewart approach repeatedly conveys the
message that the particular meanings attached to sex differences in law
are independent of social determination.
Whatever the origins of particular sex-related characteristics, 172 it is so-
cial arrangements and not biology that gives these characteristics meaning.
To put it another way, particular human characteristics have no inherent
social significance, and no social arrangements concerning sex differences
are "natural" rather than culturally determined.17 ' When confronted with
sex-related characteristics with an apparently strong biological compo-
nent-whether average differences such as height and weight (and per-
haps longevity), 7 or definitional differences such as menstruation, gesta-
tion, and lactation 1 5 -people have a tendency to think it is obvious that
171. See supra pp. 931-33 (discussing Michael M.); infra pp. 953-55 (discussing Rostker).
172. There is increasing evidence that cultural forces play a large role in causing human beings to
exhibit particular behavior patterns and personality characteristics. For example, one personality and
behavioral characteristic for which a biological basis has often been suggested is male aggressiveness.
See E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 360-66 (1974); Maccoby &
Jacklin, Sex Differences in Aggression: A Rejoinder and Reprise, 51 CHILD DEv. 964 (1980). This
conclusion has been subjected to powerful criticisms. See, e.g., E. LEACOCK, MYTHS OF MALE DOMI-
NANCE: COLLECTED ARTICLES ON WOMEN CROSS-CULTURALLY (1981); Grim, Sex and Social Roles:
How to Deal with the Data, in "FEMININITY," "MASCULINITY," AND "ANDROGYNY," supra note 8, at
128; Tieger, On the Biological Basis of Sex Differences in Aggression, 51 CHILD DEv. 943 (1980).
Moreover, some who argue strongly for a biological basis for aggression believe nonetheless that cul-
tural forces can override most biologically-generated differences. E. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE
128-29 (1978); Maccoby & Jacklin, supra, at 977.
173. The wide variations among human social arrangements across cultures provides support for
this view. See, e.g., M. MEAD, supra note 125, at 75-77; SEXUAL STRATIFICATION: A CROSS-CUL-
TURAL VIEW (A. Schlegel ed. 1977).
174. Height-weight correlations and other physical characteristics, such as proportion of body
weight that is fat or muscle, are also influenced by cultural factors. See Wood, supra note 45, at 46;
supra note 45 (discussing longevity).
175. Moreover, sex classifications justified on the basis of definitional differences will frequently
be over-inclusive, and sometimes substantially so because many members of each sex lack one or more
of the reproductive characteristics that define their sex. For example, a rule excluding all women from
a particular occupation because of reproductive hazards would be over-inclusive to the extent that it
affected women who were infertile, whether because they had passed the age of menopause or for
other reasons. Moreover, recent scientific findings suggest that many environmental factors that affect
women's reproductive capacity also affect male reproductive capacity. Thus, a two-pronged inquiry is
945
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such differences will affect daily life in important ways. People may also
think, as Justices Rehnquist and Stewart do, that existing social arrange-
ments that give those differences a particular significance do not involve
sex discrimination, but merely reflect the biological differences to which
they are related. When these propositions are examined more carefully,
however, their deficiencies become apparent. Whatever the differences be-
tween women and men, it is posssible to have arrangements that minimize
the significance of such differences.
For example, the practical impact of the differences between biological
motherhood and fatherhood that result from in utero pregnancy, the expe-
rience of childbirth, and the option of breast feeding is determined by so-
cial arrangements. Cultural patterns strongly influence how much time
mothers and fathers devote to parenting and how parenthood will affect
the employment potential of both parents. Thus, society chooses whether
to encourage men as well as women to assume significant responsibility
for day to day housework and childcare,178 decides how much to support
group childcare arrangements, 17 and determines how most people's jobs
are structured, in terms of such issues as availability of leave, lengths of
work weeks and work days, flexibility of work schedules, and locations of
work places.1 78 Since existing cultural. patterns of mother-dominated chil-
drearing are so powerful, 17  and are reinforced by the complementary
male role of primary breadwinner, 8 ' changing to more equal parenting
would require a long time and a significant collective commitment to the
needed: first, what proportion of women have the definitional characteristic; and second, is the rela-
tionship of the definitional characteristic to the challenged rule's purpose sufficiently distinctive that a
sex-based rule (or one based directly on the definitional characteristic) is appropriate? See supra p.
934.
176. See Hartmann, supra note 4, at 388-93. Hartmann suggests that the prospects for shifting a
significant share of domestic work to men are not promising, and that the conflict between the dynam-
ics of patriarchy and those of capitalism may ultimately eliminate our present system of decentralized
home production of domestic services. Id.
177. See J. GIELE, WOMEN AND THE FUTURE 194-200 (1978).
178. See, e.g., id. at 111-17; Ratner, Equal Employment for Women: Summary of Themes and
Issues, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR WOMEN, supra note 1, at 419, 427-28, 433-35.
179. See N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 191-209, 211-19 (1978); supra
note 4.
180. This role is maintained by a wide variety of social and economic pressures, including differ-
ential socialization of female and male children, see sources cited supra note 5; discrimination against
women in employment, see sources cited supra note 2; the economic advantages of specialization in
marriage, see Vickery, Women's Economic Contribution to the Family, in THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION,
supra note 2, at 159, 160-64; and the inhospitability of the labor market to the flexible work schedules
and part-time work options necessary for equal sharing of roles between parents, see M.J. Frug,
Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55
(1979). Conversely, women's performance of domestic work impairs their ability to compete equally
in the labor market. See L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY 177-80 (1975). It should be noted,
however, that although women's rates of employment are negatively correlated with their husbands'
income levels except at high socioeconomic levels, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 2, at 24-25,
husbands' contributions to housework and childcare are not greatly influenced by their wives' employ-
ment, see supra note 4.
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new ideal. Nonetheless, given such a commitment, it seems likely that over
time, male and female family and work roles would become more similar,
although biological motherhood and fatherhood would remain different in
important ways.""1
The central and inevitable role of culture in determining the existence
of most sex differences reveals the hollowness of the search for "real" dif-
ferences as the basis of sex discrimination law. Sex differences are wide-
spread and important because of human social arrangements. The central
issues are not which differences are "real" but rather what degree of sex
differentiation and inequality is desirable, and what significance existing
sex differences should have as determinants of individual life experiences
and collective social structure.
The third criticism of Rehnquist's and Stewart's sex discrimination ju-
risprudence, and one that is closely related to the second, concerns their
analysis of neutral rules that have a disproportionate impact on one sex.
In their view, there are two categories of neutral rules: a small group of
neutral rules adopted with a conscious discriminatory purpose (and there-
fore equivalent to hostile facial classifications), and a much larger category
of neutral rules and practices that harm significant numbers of women but
are not intentionally discriminatory.182 Except under Title VII, rules in
the latter category are effectively excluded from the ambit of sex discrimi-
nation jurisprudence. 3 And even under Title VII, such rules are ac-
cepted if the employer can show that they are an efficient means toward a
legitimate business goal.' This approach to neutral rules has defects sim-
ilar to those of the Rehnquist-Stewart approach to sex-based classifica-
tions allegedly justified by "real" differences between the sexes. The as-
sumption of both approaches is that rules that accurately reflect
contemporary reality are not discriminatory. Neither approach acknowl-
edges the role of culture both in generating sex differences and in giving
them significance.
In a society characterized by a high degree of sex differentiation, sex
181. For a discussion of the possibilities for change to a new "shared-role pattern," see J. BER-
NARD, supra note 4, at 248-66; N. CHODOROW, supra note 179, at 211-19; Goode, Why Men Resist,
in RETHINKING THE FAMILY 131 (B. Thorne & M. Yalom eds. 1982); Vickery, supra note 180, at
198-200.
182. See supra p. 973 (discussing Feeney).
183. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (laws that disproportionately
burden racial minorities or women violate equal protection clause "only if that impact can be traced to
a discriminatory purpose").
184. The employer's actual burden in demonstrating a "relationship" between a rule or selection
procedure and job performance varies considerably according to context. Compare Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981) (applying
rigorous standards to and invalidating multiple-choice examination for police department) with Yuhas
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978) (apply-
ing lenient standards to and upholding no-spouse hiring rule).
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segregation, and sex-based hierarchy, most facially sex-neutral rules will
have a disparate impact on one sex because of the large average differ-
ences between women and men that the system generates and reinforces,
and around which social life is organized. Moreover, facially sex-neutral
rules often contribute significantly to the maintenance of the existing sys-
tem of sex differentiation, by making particular average differences be-
tween women and men important. For example, as a result of current
social arrangements, women typically alter their work patterns during the
years when they have young children, whereas men's work patterns are
typically more consistent throughout their lives."85 Neutral rules such as
seniority systems, tenure, employer preferences for workers with uninter-
rupted work histories, and hiring patterns that favor younger over older
workers give these sex-related differences in employment patterns their
practical significance.18 6
In most instances, existing neutral rules are efficient in terms of current
social arrangements,187 and many were not adopted with conscious dis-
criminatory intent.1 8 Instead, such rules often reflect existing patterns of
sex segregation, in which the norms that are developed reflect the charac-
teristics of the majority of workers in a particular job. Moreover, as long
as existing social arrangements are built on traditional assumptions about
female and male roles, average differences between the sexes will continue
to be reinforced, and most neutral rules will continue to have disparate
effects on women and men." 9 In fact, most of public life has been
designed on the assumption that the majority-historically, all-of the
participants in that life will be male. 90 The characteristics, expectations,
185. Barrett, supra note 2, at 80-84.
186. On the long term consequences to all women workers, whether or not they personally con-
form to the general pattern, of the fact that women as a group more frequently interrupt their work
lives, see L. THUROW, supra note 180, at 177-80. On ways a variety of employer policies render
employment incompatible with childrearing, see M.J. Frug, supra note 180, at 55-61.
187. Examples of common disproportionately burdensome neutral rules that are probably efficient
under current social arrangements include the open-ended weekly time commitment required of many
attorneys, see M.J. Frug, supra note 180, at 70-74, and the preference of employers in occupations
with high training costs for workers who are statistically more likely to remain with that employer for
an extended period, see L. THUROW, supra note 180, at 177-80.
188. Rules not adopted with conscious discriminatory intent may, however, be retained for dis-
criminatory reasons. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 285 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (retention and modification of state veterans' preference statute originally adopted without
discriminatory intent reflected state's actual knowledge of disparate impact and "collateral goal of
keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place" in state's civil service, quoting id. at 279 (ma-
jority opinion)).
189. For example, existing social arrangements encourage mothers rather than fathers to take
primary responsibility for child care. See supra p. 946. As long as it is usually mothers rather than
fathers who raise children, children will grow up likely to replicate this pattern in their own lives.
This in turn will maintain all of the social and economic consequences that flow from mother-domi-
nated childrearing.
190. See Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 487, 499-500, 502
(1981).
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life patterns, and priorities of the typical woman have been treated as
exceptions or deviations from the male norm."'1 Thus, legal standards that
uphold neutral rules as long as they can be shown to be efficient or func-
tional in terms of current social arrangements fail to take account of the
cultural dynamics of sexism.
Rather than acknowledging the importance of cultural factors, the sex
discrimination jurisprudence of Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, and the
Justices who have frequently joined their opinions, adopts an extremely
limited definition of inequality between women and men. This approach
obscures our collective responsibility for making the choices that will de-
termine whether pervasive inequalities between the sexes will remain or
be eliminated.
V. The Brennan-Marsh :1 Approach: Sex Discrimination and Means-
Ends Rationality
Justices Brennan and Marshall, usually joined by Justice White, and
recently by Justice O'Connor, analyze sex discrimination cases very dif-
ferently than do Justices Rehnquist and Stewart. Under the Brennan-
Marshall approach, the alleged "reality" or "naturalness" of sex differ-
ences does not in itself justify sex classifications. All rules based on sex,
whether or not the underlying difference between women and men can be
characterized as biological,192 must be tested against the same standard of
social justification: Is the sex-based classification "substantially related" to
an "important" governmental goal?"' As applied by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, only two sex-based classifications, and no pregnancy rules
or disproportionately burdensome neutral rules, have satisfied this stan-
dard.194 The consistent effort by Brennan and Marshall to invalidate most
191. Id.
192. See supra p. 926.
193. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S 190, 197 (1976).
194. In Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam), Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined a per curiam opinion upholding a provision in the Social Security Act (since repealed) permit-
ting women to receive slightly higher retirement benefits than similarly situated male workers. Profes-
sor Maltz argues that this case presented, from Brennan's and Marshall's perspective, "unusually
favorable" factors supporting affirmance: an asserted purpose to compensate women for economic
discrimination; the lack of an administratively feasible method of determining which women had suf-
fered discrimination (in contrast to Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), where individual hearings in all
divorce cases were already being held); and little or no burden on men. See Maltz, supra note 69, at
381-82. But cf Williams, supra note 94, at 180 n.35 (suggesting that actual legislative purpose was
not to compensate women for economic discrimination, but to permit women to retire at an earlier age
than men in order to enable women married to older men to retire at the same time as their
husbands).
In Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984), Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court,
upheld a provision of the Social Security Act that exempted women who became eligible for spousal
benefits between 1977 and 1982 from a "pension offset" provision. The origins of this provision lay in
the Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), which struck down the Social
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sex-based rules, and the reasons given for their judgments, are rooted in
their perception of sex discrimination as a pervasive and morally troubling
phenomenon. Writing for the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson,195 Jus-
tice Brennan acknowledged the existence of "a long and unfortunate his-
tory of sex discrimination," and the continuation of "pervasive, although
at times . . . subtle, discrimination against women in our educational in-
stitutions, in the job market, and perhaps most conspicuously, in the polit-
ical arena." '196 Because of this past and continuing discrimination, laws
distributing benefits and burdens on the basis of sex-even when the most
obvious burden falls on men-"carry the inherent risk of reinforcing ste-
reotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special
protection,"197 and therefore must be "carefully tailored" to achieve their
goals."9 ' Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court's first woman member,
presented a similar analysis in Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan,199 writing that a "substantial relationship" between a sex-based
means and a legislative end is required "to assure that the validity of a
classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through
the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions
about the proper roles of men and women."'20
At the same time that they express what might be termed a moral or
substantive critique of sex discrimination, Justices Brennan, Marshall,
White, and O'Connor also use a mode of reasoning that emphasizes
value-neutral analysis of means-ends relationships. Indeed, the moral cri-
tique rarely serves as the explicit justification for their decisions; for ex-
ample, opinions explaining votes to invalidate challenged rules rarely refer
to the particular harms caused by the sex classifications at issue.201
Security Act's requirement that men, but not women, prove economic dependency on their spouses in
order to become eligible for spousal benefits. In response to Goldfarb, Congress eliminated the sex-
based dependency requirements, but also enacted the pension offset provision, which reduced spousal
benefits by the amount of certain federal or state government pensions received by the Social Security
applicant. Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1391. In order to protect the expectations of persons
who had planned their retirement on the basis of the pre-1977 law, Congress exempted from the
pension offset provision until December 1982 persons who would have qualified for unreduced
spousal benefits under the pre-Goldfarb rules (that is, women and economically dependent men). Id.
Although this exemption was not on its face based upon sex, its clear intent and effect was to extend a
sex-based system of calculating benefits. Id. at 1396. Justice Brennan concluded that the temporary
protection of reasonable reliance interests was an important governmental interest, and that the sex-
based means adopted by Congress was both substantially related to that objective and chosen through
"reasoned analysis" rather than mechanical application of sex-role stereotypes. Id. at 1398-1401.
195. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
196. Id. at 684, 686 (footnote omitted); see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-80 (1979); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
197. Orr, 440 U.S. at 278-80, 283.
198. Id. at 283.
199. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
200. Id. at 725-26.
201. But see infra pp. 957-60 (discussing Hogan).
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Rather, the moral critique serves two preliminary functions: to reject the
encouragement of traditional sex roles as a legitimate governmental goal,
and to create a presumption against the validity of all sex
classifications.20 2
Having established such a presumption, the Brennan-Marshall ap-
proach then uses a two-step analysis of means-ends relationships to deter-
mine whether the government has met its burden of overcoming the nega-
tive presumption. The first step is to determine the classification's actual
purpose, and whether that purpose is an "important" one.2 3 This inquiry
can be a powerful tool of judicial intervention by permitting the Court to
disregard asserted purposes as not the "actual" ones, or to discount them
as insufficiently "important." For example, in Hogan, Justice O'Connor
concluded that compensating women for past discrimination could not be
the actual purpose of an admissions policy that excluded men from a state
nursing school, because women had not been discriminated against within
the profession of nursing.
204
More typically, however, the Brennan-Marshall approach accepts the
government's asserted purpose as an actual and important one, 20 5 at least
for the sake of argument, and focuses on the second step of the analysis:
whether the classification, considered as a "means," is "substantially re-
lated" to the asserted end. Two questions are said to be particularly rele-
vant to this inquiry: whether sex is an "accurate proxy" for the character-
istics related to the end, such as economic need or subjection to prior
discrimination,20 6 and whether a sex-neutral rule would be equally effec-
tive in achieving the government's goal.20 7 A paradigm case is Orr v.
Orr,08 in which Justice Brennan analyzed the permissible goals of an
Alabama law imposing alimony obligations only on husbands. Such a law,
he reasoned, could be deemed to provide financial assistance to needy
spouses (with sex serving as a "proxy" for economic need), or to compen-
sate women for "discrimination" during marriage that left them unable to
support themselves upon divorce.20 9 While conceding that these were le-
202. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
203. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-25 (1982).
204. Id. at 729-30. Justice O'Connor also relied on two other grounds in rejecting the state's
asserted compensatory goal: (1) that the sex-based admissions rule reinforced sex stereotypes about
nursing as a women's profession and contributed to the low level of nurses' wages, see infra pp.
958-59, and (2) that even if women had suffered discrimination within the nursing profession, the
state had failed to show that the legislature actually intended the sex-based admissions rule to have a
compensatory purpose. 458 U.S. at 730 n.16.
205. The only purpose that the Court has clearly found to be insufficiently "important" is "ad-
ministrative convenience." See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
206. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1979).
207. See id. at 281, 283.
208. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
209. Id. at 280.
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gitimate and important governmental goals,210 Brennan reasoned that the
rule making only husbands liable for alimony was not substantially re-
lated to achieving these goals, because state law already provided for indi-
vidual hearings in all divorces; at such hearings, a sex-neutral inquiry
could be made about relative financial need and the impact of any "dis-
crimination." The rule barring husbands from seeking alimony was thus
"gratuitous," because it would cost the state nothing to provide benefits
for needy husbands as well as needy wives, and because making such ben-
efits available to husbands would "not in any way" compromise benefits
for needy wives."1 The emphasis in Brennan's opinion was thus not on
the moral or substantive harms caused by a law requiring only husbands
to pay alimony, but rather on the "irrationality" of such a law in achiev-
ing the state's "own" asserted goals.
The Brennan-Marshall approach contributes in important ways to the
ongoing debate about the meaning and desirability of equality between the
sexes. Unlike the Rehnquist-Stewart approach, which is largely premised
on an unreflective biological determinism, the Brennan-Marshall ap-
proach imposes the same requirements of justification on all sex-based
rules, whether or not the sex difference asserted has a biological compo-
nent. It also presumes that all sex classifications are harmful and could be
replaced with sex-neutral rules, and imposes on the government the bur-
den of proving that these presumptions are incorrect. By subjecting the
government's argument to careful analysis, this approach often demon-
strates the feasibility of sex-neutral alternatives, and the stereotyped
thinking about the sexes that underlies the challenged rules.
At the same time, the description of the harms caused by sex discrimi-
nation is often truncated, so that the analysis of means-ends rationality
becomes the dominant element in the opinions. As a result, the most pow-
erful message the opinions convey is that sex discrimination is irrational
as a means to promote the legislature's own goals.212 By implication, the
210. Id.
211. Id. at 282.
212. The theme of means-ends rationality is closely connected to perceptions of similarity and
difference between the groups affected by a law. If two groups (for example, women and men) are in
fact identically situated in relation to the legislature's goal, then it is arbitrary and irrational for the
legislature to distinguish between them. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 10 1-02 (1979) (analyzing one approach to sex discrimination law as prohibition of irrational
differentiation between women and men). A similar emphasis on means-ends rationality has devel-
oped in judicial doctrine regarding racial discrimination. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108-11 (1976); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1058-59, 1061-64 (1978). Alternatively, when challenged legislation appears to be "irrational"
in terms of the government's articulated goal, courts may become suspicious that the legislature's
actual goal was an illegitimate one, such as a desire to harm or subordinate the burdened group. See
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-46 (1980).
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Court's role is to correct a legislative "mistake" of failing to recognize that
with a small expenditure (or perhaps no expenditure) of administrative
resources-for example, by substituting a functional rule for a sex-based
classification, or by providing individualized hearings-sex equality and
other social ends could be pursued at the same time. The opinions ac-
knowledge that this legislative "mistake" may have been caused by out-
moded views about sex differences, and even that the legislation may have
been premised on the illegitimate goal of maintaining traditional sex
roles.213 The central theme, however, is that sex classifications are funda-
mentally irrational.
In situations such as Orr, where there is wide consensus on the Court
that the challenged statute is based on an "outmoded" sex stereotype, this
method of analysis seems to work smoothly enough. The Brennan-
Marshall emphasis on means-ends rationality runs into difficulty, though,
in what Professor Wendy Williams has appropriately termed the "hard"
sex discrimination cases: those in which the Court, and society more gen-
erally, is seriously split over whether perceived sex differences are indeed
based on "outmoded" sex stereotypes, or whether the stereotypes are accu-
rate and desirable.2 4 Both the advantages and difficulties of focusing on
means-ends analysis are apparent in three recent cases of this sort, involv-
ing the exclusion of women from registration for the military draft
(Rostker), the imposition of criminal penalties for statutory rape only on
males (Michael M.), and the refusal to admit men to an all-women's state
nursing school (Hogan).
Rostker involved the controversial question of whether women should
be required to register for the military draft. As part of his 1980 proposal
to reactivate draft registration, President Carter recommended that Con-
gress amend the Military Selective Service Act to permit the registration
and conscription of women as well as men.215 After a fairly extensive con-
sideration of this question, Congress rejected the President's recommenda-
tion and authorized funds only for the registration of men.21 In uphold-
ing Congress' action against an equal protection challenge by men, Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion focused on the asserted technical or adminis-
trative reasons for Congress' decision: that because women were excluded
from combat positions in the Armed Forces, drafting even small numbers
of women would cause administrative and military difficulties. If drafting
women to fill non-combat roles was not feasible, as the congressional com-
213. See, e.g, Orr, 440 U.S. at 279-83; Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 491-96
(1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
214. See Williams, supra note 94, at 180 & passim.
215. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 60 (1981).
216. Id. at 61, 72-74.
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mittee reports asserted, it followed that excluding women from draft regis-
tration was a rational policy based on a "real" difference between women
and men with respect to eligibility for combat duty.
2 17
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Rostker, despite occasional ref-
erences to larger themes, 218 accepted Justice Rehnquist's narrow charac-
terization of the issues. Like the male plaintiffs challenging the registra-
tion law, Justice Marshall did not question the validity of excluding
women from combat, 219 nor refer to Congress' assumptions about male
and female roles on which the exclusion from both combat and registra-
tion was based. 20 Rather, he argued that Justice Rehnquist's opinion
misrepresented Congress' analysis of the administrative difficulties, and
that Congress itself had failed to support its decision not to register
women. 2 1 As Marshall viewed the legislative record, there was no reason
217. Id. at 78-79, 82-83.
218. See id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for placing Court's "im-
primatur on one of the most potent remaining public expressions of 'ancient canards about the proper
role of women' ") (citation omitted).
219. See id. at 87 n.2, 93. Justice Marshall did not explicitly deal with the exclusion of women
from combat. He noted that the plaintiffs, while not conceding the constitutionality of the exclusion,
had chosen not to challenge it, arguing that its validity was "irrelevant" to this case.
220. The most authoritative legislative expression of Congress' reasoning about male-only regis-
tration, see id. at 73-74 (majority opinion), is contained in S. REP. NO. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2612. In addition to expressing concern about
violating the "fundamental" principle that women should not "intentionally and routinely engage in
combat," id. at 157, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2647, and doubts about the "perform-
ance of sexually mixed units," id., the Senate Report found that
there are important societal reasons for not changing our present male-only system of registra-
tion and induction. The question of who should be required to fight for the Nation and how
best to accomplish that end is a social issue of the highest order, with sweeping implications for
our society. In addition to the military reasons, which the committee finds compelling, wit-
nesses representing a variety of groups testified before the subcommittee that drafting women
would place unprecedented strains on family life, whether in peacetime or in time of emer-
gency. If such a draft occurred at a time of emergency, unpredictable reactions to the fact of
female conscription would result. A decision which would result in a young mother being
drafted and a young father remaining home with the family in a time of national emergency
cannot be taken lightly, nor its broader implications ignored. The committee is strongly of the
view that such a result, which would occur if women were registered and inducted under the
administration plan, is unwise and unacceptable to a large majority of our people.
Id. at 159, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2649. Remarkably, none of the opinions in
Rostker quoted or discussed this reasoning, although it embodies the kind of beliefs about sex roles
that has been disapproved by the Court in other cases.
221. Marshall's dissent in Rostker noted that Congress had not found-as Rehnquist stated-that
drafting small numbers of women would cause administrative and military problems. 453 U.S. at 107-
11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Rather, the key Senate Report had argued that registering women and
men in equal numbers would inevitably lead to drafting women and men in equal numbers, with
consequent burdens on the training and administrative systems. Id. at 109-10. The Report's reasoning
on this point-that the current draft law did not authorize sex distinctions among draftees, and that
the courts might invalidate such distinctions-was unpersuasive. See id. at 109 (quoting S. REP. NO.
826, supra note 220, at 158-59, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2648). A Congress that could
treat women and men differently for registration purposes could certainly amend the draft law in a
similar fashion. As Marshall noted, the combat exclusion and related administrative considerations
would provide far stronger constitutional support for a sex-differentiated draft than for male-only
registration. Id. at 111.
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why Congress could not require all women and men to register, draft only
the number of women needed for non-combat positions, and thereby avoid
the administrative difficulties that were anticipated if large numbers of
women were drafted.222 Since, from this perspective, the male-only regis-
tration had no relationship to any government objective, it was invalid
under the substantial relationship standard.
Justice Marshall's contention that Congress could register women and
men on an equal basis and later use sex classifications in the draft itself
makes an important point about the desirability of replacing sex classifica-
tions with sex-neutral rules whenever possible. In particular, the symbolic
significance of imposing on both young women and young men the obliga-
tion to be available for military service should not be underestimated. 23
At the same time, Marshall's opinion studiously de-emphasizes the actual
assumptions underlying Congress' action. Congress was obviously aware
that the Defense Department believed that 80,000 women draftees could
be used without administrative problems in a total draft of 650,000 per-
sons,2 24 and it is difficult to believe that Congress saw the asserted legal
problems involved in drafting fewer women than men as dispositive.
Rather, as Rehnquist, Marshall, and everyone else knew, Congress did
not want to draft or register any women, primarily because of cultural
beliefs and values about the proper roles and capabilities of the sexes.225
Congress' decision was not, as Justice Marshall's dissent suggests, "irra-
tional" in terms of functional criteria that everyone agreed on; rather, it
was "rational" in terms of the traditional cultural beliefs articulated in the
congressional hearings. Although Marshall's opinion implicitly challenged
these views, his failure to expose these beliefs and values undercut the
force of his challenge.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael M. did refer explicitly to the cul-
tural beliefs and values underlying California's statutory rape law.2 6 The
222. Id.
223. See Brief for Amicus Curiae National Organization for Women at 21-25, Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (women psychologically and politically harmed by not being compelled
to participate in activity that is perceived as entitling people to leadership positions in society; exclu-
sion relegates women to second-class citizenship).
224. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 82 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.); id. at 100 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
225. See supra note 220.
226. Brennan does comment that the statutory rape law is based on outmoded sexual stereotypes,
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 496 (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting), but makes no
stronger comment about the state's choice to use a sex classification in this situation. In contrast,
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion closes by stating: "A rule that authorizes punishment of only one of
two equally guilty wrongdoers violates the essence of the constitutional requirement that the sovereign
must govern impartially." Id. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Another weakness of the Brennan-Marshall approach's criticism of sex discrimination results from
its emphasis on the availability of effective gender-neutral alternatives to the challenged policies. In
Aichael M., one wonders what Brennan's position would have been if no jurisdiction had adopted
The Yale Law Journal
core point in the opinion, however, was that the sex classification was
irrational in terms of the state's own asserted goal, which was the deter-
rence of teenage pregnancy by prohibiting males of all ages from engaging
in non-marital intercourse with minor females. Brennan noted that thirty-
seven other states already had gender-neutral statutory rape laws, and ap-
parently had not experienced any unusual enforcement problems.2 27 Cali-
fornia's argument that a gender-neutral law would be harder to enforce
(because young women would not complain and subject themselves to the
risk of criminal liability), was thus in Brennan's view simply mistaken. 228
In addition, Brennan observed that the small number of arrests for statu-
tory rape compared to the large amount of sexual intercourse involving
teenage females cast great doubt on the law's effectiveness as a
deterrent.229
As with Rostker, Justice Brennan's insistence on the feasibility of writ-
ing and enforcing a sex-neutral statutory rape law raises important points.
Sex-neutral statutes of this sort recognize the essential similarity of the
harms to young people of each sex that can result from premature sexual
activity. The process of revising a sex-based law may also stimulate a
needed recognition that the old sex-based statute was inconsistent with
contemporary reality, in that it criminalized certain conduct-non-forcible
sexual relations between two teenagers-that most people would agree
should not be subject to criminal penalties. Legislatures engaged in the
revision process have often made the new statute more specific, so that the
harms with which the legislature was in fact most concerned were distin-
guished from other less harmful conduct.230 For example, they have often
redrafted the statutes to penalize intercourse with adolescents between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen only when there is a significant age gap
such laws covering the relevant age group. (This is a realistic possibility, since only three jurisdictions
have sex-neutral statutory rape laws without either lowering the age of the protected group, or limit-
ing prosecution to situations where one party is several years older than the other party. 450 U.S. at
492 (Brennan, J., dissenting).) In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 341 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Marshall discusses the successful use of women
prison guards in other states; emphasizes the absence of evidence that the claimed problem of sexual
assaults would materialize, id. at 345-46; and notes that Alabama was under court order to hire new
personnel and otherwise to improve prison conditions, changes that would "substantially alleviate" the
problems "that the Court perceives with women guards," id. at 345 n.4. See supra p. 936. To pose a
realistic hypothetical, suppose that Alabama had experimented with women prison guards and had
problems with sexual as well as physical assaults, and that the state was not under court order to
improve the prisons in ways that would reduce the risks of all types of inmate assaults on guards.
Would Marshall take the position that Alabama should spend more money to make its prisons safe
rather than excluding women from guard positions?
227. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 492-93 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228. See id.
229. Id. at 493 n.8.
230. For a detailed analysis of pre-1977 state reforms of rape laws, including statutory rape, with
examples of particular provisions, see B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, supra note
11, at 45-66.
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between the two participants, or when there is evidence of improper influ-
ence or coercion by one participant."' Had Brennan's approach been
adopted by the Court, this process, which was already underway in a
significant number of states, would have been encouraged.
At the same time, Justice Brennan did not himself discuss the impor-
tance of the revision process, or the harms caused by sex-based statutory
rape laws. As noted earlier, it is extremely unlikely that the purpose of
California's statutory rape law was to deter teenage pregnancy.2 32 Instead,
there is substantial reason to believe that the California legislature singled
out males for punishment because of the prevalent notion of males as sex-
ual aggressors and young females as their victims, even when the sexual
relationships involved are technically consensual ones.233 Yet Brennan's
dissent mentions the relationship of this statute to traditional ideas about
female and male sexuality and sex roles only in passing, and places no
weight on this issue as an independent reason for the invalidation of the
statute.234 And while it seems likely that Brennan believes that it is mor-
ally offensive to make one's sex determinative of the criminality of one's
conduct,235 there is nothing in his dissent in Michael M. that directly
expresses that position. By analyzing the statute in relationship to the im-
plausible purpose of deterring teenage pregnancy, Brennan was able to
demonstrate its irrationality. But in doing so, he lost an opportunity to
expose the stereotypes underlying the statute's more plausible justification.
The California legislature's choice to retain a sex-based statutory rape
law reflects an unwillingness to develop an approach that might be con-
strued as condoning sexual activity among teenagers. California's decision
to retain an archaic sex-based law, and leave the mitigation of its over-
breadth to prosecutorial discretion, was not irrational; it was unprincipled
and unjust. Justice Brennan's dissent does not clearly address these under-
lying issues.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan2 3 6 reflects both continuity with the Brennan-Marshall
emphasis on means-ends rationality, and at least the possibility of move-
ment toward a more substantive approach to sex discrimination. Hogan, a
male registered nurse seeking to obtain a baccalaureate degree in nursing,
231. See id. at 56 & n.12 (describing New Mexico statute that limits prosecutions for statutory
rape of persons aged 13-16 to incidents involving perpetrators in a relationship of authority to the
victim); id. at 58 & n.18 (state statutes requiring age differentials if younger participant is 13 or
older); id. at 61-66 (model statute based on Michigan and California laws).
232. See supra pp. 931-33.
233. See id.
234. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 494-96 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-80 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99
(1976).
236. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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challenged the exclusion of men from the baccalaureate program in the
School of Nursing at the Mississippi University for Women.23 7 The state
defended its policy of sex segregation as a method of compensating for
discrimination against women, and thus as educational affirmative ac-
tion.238 Justice O'Connor concluded on two different grounds that the
state's asserted compensatory purpose was not the "actual" purpose of the
rule.2"' First, the compensatory purpose was not credible because the state
could not show any discrimination against women within the field of
nursing for which compensation was needed.240 Second, the asserted com-
pensatory purpose was undercut by specific harms caused by the sex-
based classification.
241
The first reason offered by Justice O'Connor is closely analogous to the
Brennan-Marshall emphasis on means-ends rationality. Whether framed
in the vocabulary of "actual purpose" (as in Hogan), or of "substantial
relationship" (as in Orr), the state's failure to show that a sex-based clas-
sification is needed for any legitimate goal means that the classification is
"gratuitous" or "irrational. 2 42 O'Connor's second point regarding "actual
purpose," however, focused more explicitly on substantive harms caused
by excluding men from the nursing school. From this perspective, the ex-
clusionary rule is invalid because it tends "to perpetuate the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job," and makes that view "a
self-fulfilling prophecy" by reserving more nursing school places for
women than for men. 43 Moreover, O'Connor noted that by encouraging
sex segregation of the nursing profession, the policy helped maintain the
relatively low level of nurses' wages.244
Both branches of Justice O'Connor's "actual purpose" analysis illumi-
nate the cultural dynamics of sexism. Her insistence on carefully testing
the state's asserted compensatory rationale highlights the importance of
distinguishing between affirmative action and traditional paternalism to-
ward women. By articulating the relationship between sex-segregated
nursing schools and the sex segregation of the nursing profession, she em-
phasizes the need to consider the broad social costs of special treatment for
237. Id. at 720-21. Two baccalaureate nursing programs were open to both women and men at
two other state universities, both located more than 140 miles from where Hogan lived and worked.
Id. at 735 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor found this "considerable distance" to be a
"disadvantage" imposed on Hogan because of his sex, especially considering that many nursing stu-
dents hold full-time jobs. Id. at 723 n.8 (O'Connor, J.).
238. Id. at 727.
239. Id. at 729-30.
240. Id. at 729.
241. Id. at 729-30.
242. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
243. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30 (footnote omitted).
244. Id. at 729 n.15.
Vol. 92: 913, 1983
Sex Equality
women as well as the specific benefits that treatment is supposed to
produce.
But ultimately, Justice O'Connor's argument is a narrow one. To her
credit, she did not limit her analysis to lack of discrimination against
women within a "woman's" profession, but went on to make the point
that maintenance of a sex-segregated woman's profession is itself an im-
portant form of discrimination against women, as well as against the men
excluded from it.2 "5 Her opinion, however, offers little guidance for the
many situations in which women have suffered some discrimination or
disadvantage compared with male workers in the same or closely anal-
ogous fields. Also, as Chief Justice Burger points out,246 O'Connor's opin-
ion sheds little light on the fate of sex-segregated state educational pro-
grams (such as liberal arts programs) that are not directly linked to tradi-
tionally female professions.
2 47
Justice O'Connor's choice to avoid some of these broader questions is,
of course, consistent with the traditional legal principle that judicial deci-
sions should be framed in the narrowest possible terms.2 8 On the other
hand, this choice, similar to that made in Justice Marshall's dissent in
Rostker and Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael M., precluded a direct
debate in the Supreme Court over more fundamental issues raised by the
case and argued by the dissenting Justices. To many Americans, including
many women, sex-segregated education for women (whether public or
private) is neither irrational nor discriminatory. 24" The dissenting Justices
in Hogan-Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Burger-probably spoke
for a significant number of citizens when they argued that the value of
"diversity" justified the availability of sex-segregated education as an op-
tion, at least if equivalent coeducational programs were "available.1 250
245. Id. at 729-30 & n.15.
246. In a brief dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger argued that the narrowness of O'Connor's
opinion "suggests that a State might well be justified in maintaining, for example, the option of an
all-women's business school or liberal arts program." Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
247. In addition to ruling that the state had no actual compensatory purpose, Justice O'Connor
held that excluding men was not "substantially related" to such a purpose. Id. at 730-31. O'Connor
pointed out that the state already permitted men to audit classes and to participate in continuing
education programs, with full rights of class participation. Id. Moreover, uncontroverted testimony by
nursing school faculty established that the presence of men in nursing school classes had no impact on
teaching styles or on the participation of female students. Id. at 730.
248. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principles and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) (referring to Court's "obligation not
to decide the broad constitutional question if narrower grounds of decision are available").
249. Justice Powell pointed out in his Hogan dissent that "[t]he only groups with any personal
acquaintance with MUW to file amicus briefs are female students and alumnae of MUW. And they
have emphatically rejected [Hogan's] arguments, urging that the State of Mississippi be allowed to
continue offering the choice from which they have benefited." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 736 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
250. See id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that coeducational nursing pro-
grams were "open to males" and suggesting that majority opinion required "needless conformity"); id.
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Justice O'Connor's brief response to this argument avoided any explicit
analysis of the relationship of sex-segregated education to broader issues
of sex discrimination against women, and merely stated that providing ed-
ucational "benefits" to women only-and hence discriminating against
men-had to be justified by a showing of substantial relationship to a
"legitimate and substantial goal. ' 51 Not surprisingly, the dissenters had
difficulty seeing why the state's maintenance of one nursing school for
women, while providing other, coeducational nursing programs, imposed
any substantial burden on men.2 52 There are answers to this point, but as
in Rostker and Michael M., they require a substantive analysis of the
impact of sex-based rules on both women and men. In a society in which
women and men are channeled from childhood into different social roles,
personality types, and patterns of behavior, educational sex segregation
encourages similarity among individuals of each sex-in the form of con-
formity to traditional sex roles-and "diversity" only between the sexes.
Moreover, it supports the idea that there are fundamental differences be-
tween the sexes that make sex segregation appropriate. The Brennan-
Marshall approach's emphasis on means-ends rationality discourages ex-
amination of these issues.
VI. Toward a More Compelling Sex Discrimination Jurisprudence
The "hard" cases reveal how the Rehnquist-Stewart and Brennan-
Marshall approaches simultaneously acknowledge and deny the need for
significant changes in sex roles and sex-based hierarchy. The Rehnquist-
Stewart approach claims to reject traditional ideas about proper sex roles,
yet adopts in a modified form the very beliefs about natural differences
between women and men that it at first appears to challenge. Moreover,
the approach's focus on "real" differences obscures what is in fact a moral
choice to tolerate a high level of culturally generated sex inequality. In
contrast, the Brennan-Marshall approach's emphasis on the irrationality
of challenged sex classifications incorporates moral judgments about the
harms of sexism, at least as a preliminary matter, but also implies that
only irrational sex classifications are harmful or necessary to change. As a
result, the approach fails to address situations in which the pursuit of sex
equality is difficult or costly and in which the use of sex classifications is
at 735, 742 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing value of "diversity" and arguing that Hogan suffered only
inconvenience). Whether coeducational programs 178 and 147 miles from Hogan's residence were
"available" to him was, of course, a matter of dispute. See id. at 723 n.8 (O'Connor, J.); supra note
237.
251. Id. at 731 n.17.
252. See id. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 735, 742 (Powell, J., dissenting); supra note
250.
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therefore arguably rational. The choice to pursue sex equality rather than
other social goals in these situations can be justified only on the basis of
an explicitly normative theory of sex equality that identifies with some
particularity the dynamics and harmful consequences of sexism. Despite
an apparently strong commitment to sex equality, the Brennan-Marshall
approach largely avoids articulating a theory of this sort. The following
sections argue that such a theory is consistent with our traditions of con-
stitutional jurisprudence, describe such a theory's essential elements, and
contend that judicial adoption of the approach advocated would make a
significant contribution to contemporary struggles for sex equality.
A. Adopting an Explicitly Normative Approach to Constitutional Law
A first step toward the formulation of a more compelling sex discrimi-
nation jurisprudence is a recognition that constitutional law need not
avoid making its moral choices explicit, and that explicitly normative tra-
ditions are as consistent with our constitutional history as traditions that
attempt to be value neutral.
It is true, of course, that one tradition of constitutional law holds that
explicit judicial value-choice is constitutionally unjustified and politically
risky. This view has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall's historic opinion
in Marbury v. Madison,25 which grounded judicial review on the claim
that the Constitution is a type of "law" to be interpreted and applied like
the more familiar forms of statute'and judicial precedent.2 54 Central to
this claim is a distinction between law and politics, that is, between "ap-
plying" law to particular cases and "making" law.255 Under this view,
judicial interpretation of the Constitution should not be a matter of nor-
mative choice, but rather the discovery, through a distinctive legal method,
of authoritative principles and rules established in some politically legiti-
mate manner, followed by the "application" of those principles and rules
to reach results in particular cases.2 56
253. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
254. Id. at 178-80.
255. Id. at 165-71; see also Nedelsky, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 340, 350-60 (1982) (dis-
cussing importance of distinction between law and politics to Federalist party and Marshall Court).
The law-politics distinction is not, of course, peculiar to constitutional law, and pervades the Anglo-
American and Western European legal traditions. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 88-90 &
passim (1975); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 52-53, 177-81 (1976); . Kennedy, Legal For-
mality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973) (arguing that distinction, though fundamental to liberal
thought, is incoherent within its premises).
256. A modern classic statement advocating an approach to constitutional law said to be distinc-
tively legal is Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959). For arguments about why Wechsler's approach is not distinctively legal, see Deutsch, Neu-
trality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science,
20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 183 (1968). For general criticisms of "neutral principles," see Dworkin, The
Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 469-71 (1981); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
The Yale Law Journal
Since the ideal of distinctively "legal" constitutional jurisprudence was
first advanced by Chief Justice Marshall, however, it has co-existed with
a more explicitly normative theory justifying judicial review in terms of
important substantive values. As the breadth of Marshall's own argu-
ments in Marbury suggests,2 57 the Court then (and since) has not func-
tioned simply as "an ultimate tribunal for resolving disputes,"'2 58 but also,
in Professor Robert Cover's words, as "the political philosopher, or if one
prefers a more pejorative connotation, the ideologue of the American de-
mocracy." 259 From this perspective, constitutional "law" is "the line at
which the plane of political ideas meets that of political action . . . and
represents an enormous series of statements as to what are or are not the
implications of the central principles of our politics. '2 60 In asserting the
validity of political and philosophical inquiry as part of constitutional ad-
judication, this tradition emphasizes a broad definition of politics. It is not
partisan politics or crude pragmatics that are celebrated, but rather nor-
mative inquiry, involving the continuing reconstruction of general consti-
tutional principles in light of our traditions and present situation.26 1 In-
deed, most of the great decisions of modern constitutional law-those
concerning freedom of speech, race and sex discrimination, and voting, for
example-are normative in this sense.
262
In the years since the birth of Legal Realism in the 1920's, the elusive-
ness of the distinction between legal and non-legal decisionmaking has
been repeatedly recognized. Supporters of the distinction have made nu-
merous attempts to articulate "neutral," and "principled" bases of judicial
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
257. Chief Justice Marshall's arguments about the Constitution as a form of "law" followed, and
were inextricably intertwined with, arguments that legal remedies for violations of "vested legal
rights" are "the very essence of civil liberty," and flow from the premise that the American political
system must be "a government of laws, and not of men." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 162 (1803).
258. Cover, The Left, The Right and the First Amendment: 1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REV. 349,
349 (1981).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 350; see Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9, 29-30 (1979).
261. Tushnet, supra note 256, at 798-804. Various approaches to normative jurisprudence are
articulated in Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 4-11 (1983) (describing general relationship of law and social norms); Fiss, supra note 260
(defending privileged position of judges as articulators of "public" or fundamental values);
Michelman, Constancy to an Ideal Object, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 406, 414-15 (1981) (arguing that new
constitutional claims to adequate subsistence might be justified not on basis of the Framers' original
intent, but on basis of "the cumulation of principles" reflected in prior constitutional decisions); Un-
ger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 579-80 (1983) (describing process
of "mutual correction of abstract ideals and their institutional realizations").
262. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61-92 (1982) (ar-
guing that little of modern constitutional law is supported by original intent of Framers); Tushnet,
supra note 256, at 798-804.
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review."' Critics have persuasively responded with careful demonstrations
of how the articulated neutral concepts are both internally inconsistent 26
and themselves value-laden.265 The critics are persuasive because they rec-
ognize that both the text of the Constitution and its related social theories
generate multiple interpretations, and that in order to choose among them
judges must in turn choose among competing principles of political moral-
ity that cannot be "derived" in a determinate way from the text of the
Constitution and the intent of its Framers.266
If text and intent do not require adoption of either the anti-normative
or normative traditions of legal thought, on what basis should judges
choose their perspective? The most common type of argument is entirely
pragmatic: Whatever the intellectual strength of either tradition, the "po-
litical capital" of the courts, and particularly of the United States Su-
preme Court, is said to rest entirely on the anti-normative or legalistic
tradition. Public belief-however unjustified-that the Court is simply
"applying law" made by the constitutional framers is thought to be essen-
tial if the Court's power is to be politically acceptable to Congress, the
President, and the people at large. 67
Although this tactical view of legal reasoning is common, it is difficult
to test its validity.266 Do the American people or significant sub-groups
currently believe that Supreme Court decisions flow directly from the
Constitution's text and Framers' intent? It is true that in confirmation
263. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS (1962); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); J. ELY,
supra note 212; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971); Wechsler, supra note 256.
264. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 256, at 785 & passim; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of
Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
265. See, e.g., Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Pro-
tection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1055-59 (1980); Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Parker,
The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO STATE L.J. 223, 235-39 (1981).
266. See Brest, supra note 265; Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982);
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Brest, Original Understanding]; Michelman, supra note 261, at 409; Tushnet, supra
note 256; Unger, supra note 261, at 567-576.
267. M. PERRY, supra note 262, at 139-140; M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME
COURT 27 (1964).
268. The difficulties stem from several sources. First, most writing on public attitudes toward the
Supreme Court has been "based more on impressions of what the public thinks than on systematically
collected data." Casey, The Supreme Court and Myth: An Empirical Investigation, 8 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 385, 386 (1974). Second, the most common finding of public opinion analysts is that many
citizens are largely unaware of the Supreme Court's decisions, and have no clear criteria for evaluat-
ing its performance. Id. at 403, 405, 409. Since many people have little knowledge of what the Su-
preme Court does and no basis for assessing its legitimacy, it is difficult to test how they would
respond to decisions explicitly justified in normative terms. Third, even those persons who are aware
of and adhere to anti-normative concepts of judicial legitimacy as a general matter might evaluate
particular decisions in substantive terms. See Tushnet, supra note 256, at 807; infra note 272 (discuss-
ing survey findings).
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hearings, nominees to the Supreme Court usually profess adherence to
this tradition2"9 and anti-normative principles are frequently invoked by
critics of Court decisions.2 70 On the other hand, the anti-normative ideals
have been strongly criticized for many years in both legal scholarship and
the popular media as unrealized and unrealizable." 1 The most influential
audiences for the Court's opinions-Congress, the executive branch, the
legal profession, the lower courts, and the media-must by now be aware
of the controversial nature of claims of distinctively legal and value-
neutral decisionmaking.272 Moreover, even if it could be shown that some
portions of the public believe in the possibility and desirability of value-
free constitutional decisionmaking, and further, believe that means-ends
rationality analysis is an appropriate way to accomplish that function, it is
not clear that the courts should pursue this ideal. As argued above, the
kind of judging demanded by the anti-normative ideal is in fact unattaina-
ble. Systematic concealment of the role of normative considerations in con-
stitutional decisionmaking is thus, in Professor Paul Brest's phrase, "anti-
democratic," 2 7 in that citizens are denied the opportunity for meaningful
criticism of the allocation of decisionmaking authority between judges and
legislators or of the values judges in fact employ. Finally, people may
want an anti-normative jurisprudence largely because the courts have told
them it is possible to have one.274 Thus, judicial opinions may shape, as
well as be shaped by, popular conceptions of appropriate judicial roles,
leaving open the possibility of change on both sides.
269. Tushnet, supra note 256, at 781-82.
270. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 417-18 & passim (1977); Bork, supra
note 263, at 3-4 & passim.
271. See M. PERRY, supra note 262, at 140-41; Brest, Original Understanding, supra note 266, at
235.
272. But see Tushnet, supra note 256, at 807 (acknowledging that "influential publicists" may
believe in the desirability and possibility of neutral principles). A number of studies by social scientists
appear to support the proposition that people who are more knowledgeable about Supreme Court
decisions are also more likely to accept the distinction between law and politics and other aspects of
"the myth" of Supreme Court decisionmaking. Casey, supra note 268, at 408-410; Sarat, Studying
American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 427, 440-41
(1977). This proposition may not effectively contradict the statement in the text. First, the studies
involved did not focus on the most influential audiences for the Court's opinions-other judges, gov-
ernment officials, and the media. Second, they did not carefully define "the myth" about Supreme
Court decisionmaking, thereby undercutting the nature and significance of the survey results. Third,
the surveys date from the late 1950's to the late 1960's and may not accurately reflect current
attitudes.
273. Brest, Original Understanding, supra note 266, at 234.
274. See id.
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B. Recognizing the True Costs of Sex Discrimination and Exploring
Sex-Equal Alternatives
In addition to adopting a normative view of constitutional law, an ap-
proach to sex discrimination that attempts to promote equality between
the sexes must describe in concrete terms the harmful consequences of
sexism and must also consider what alternative social arrangements are
desirable. The subordination of women is so deeply embedded in contem-
porary social, economic, and political structures that the achievement of
equality will be both difficult and costly. Moreover, sex differences have
been built into people's sense of themselves and into their relations with
others from their earliest moments.2 5 Reexamining sex differentiation
throughout the society is thus extremely threatening to most people. Only
a broad critique of sexist practices and patterns and a compelling vision of
a new social order will provide the impetus needed for change of this
magnitude and difficulty. Feminists both inside and outside the legal pro-
fession are currently devoting considerable effort to developing such criti-
cal and constructive visions.2 76 Without attempting to provide a compre-
hensive account, this section delineates some of the premises and essential
features of the feminist critical enterprise.
The most important premise is that women have distinctive perspectives
that must play an important role in social transformation. 2 " Sexism has
always rested most profoundly on a denial that women are conscious
275. For a powerful explanation of the interaction between sense of self and sense of gender that
characterizes personality development among individuals raised predominantly by women, see N.
CHODOROW, supra note 179, at 173-209. For a similar analysis in more sociological terms, see D.
DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE
26-197 (1976). For a discussion of the extent to which advertisements reflect the powerful social forces
that shape people's sense of themselves as female and male, see E. GOFFMAN, GENDER ADVERTISE-
MENTS (1979).
276. Feminist legal writings of this sort include C. MACKINNON, supra note 212; M.J. Frug,
supra note 180; Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Sex Stereotyping Per Se as a
Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345 (1980); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism,
and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581 (1977); Williams,
supra note 94, at 190. Non-legal writings are far more numerous. Examples from different disciplines
include N. CHODOROW, supra note 179 (psychology and sociology); D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 275
(same); and the works of Heidi Hartmann, see supra notes 4, 25 (Marxist economic analysis). Addi-
tional examples can be found in the periodicals Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society and
Feminist Studies, which are major forums for feminist scholarly work.
277. As the following discussion makes clear, it is cultural factors that cause the difference in
women's perspectives. On the philosophical problems posed by the simultaneous assertion that men
dominate culture and that distinctive female perspectives are possible, see MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y,
515, 542-44 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MacKinnon, Agenda]; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y,
635, 635-39 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence]. For a description of
and call for critical feminist theory that makes female self-understanding central, see J. ELSHTAIN,
PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 302-06 (1981).
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human "subjects" whose perspectives are worthy of respect by males.2" 8
The repudiation of this tradition requires the opposite conclusion: that the
perspectives of the primary victims of discrimination must play a major
role both in defining the problem of discrimination and in constructing
responses to it.2"9
The incorporation of women's perspectives has several key elements.
One is the identification and analysis of the mechanisms by which the
harms associated with sexism are imposed and maintained. Some of these
mechanisms-such as stereotypes about the proper roles and differential
capacities of women and men-have been identified and condemned by
the courts, but have not been attacked as comprehensively as the problem
of sexism demands.2 80 Other major mechanisms of sex-based hierarchy
that must be analyzed include sex segregation, especially in employ-
ment,281 and the practice of conceiving of the "public" realm of employ-
ment and politics and the "private" realm of the family and intimate rela-
tionships as separate and dichotomous spheres. 82 Judicial and legislative
efforts to grapple with these patterns have barely begun. Still other con-
cepts buttressing sexism-such as "real" differences and the equation of
sex discrimination with irrationality-are embedded in current Supreme
Court doctrine. In most instances, women's contributions to the analytic
process are vital. Without their insights, the harms of many practices
278. The clearest expression of this position in American constitutional law can be found in Jus-
tice Bradley's opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (Bradley, J., con-
curring). Justice Bradley, affirming the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court to exclude women from
the legal profession, reasoned that
[t]he harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent
career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment . . . that it became a
maxim of [the common law] . . . that a woman had no legal existence separate from her
husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state ....
Id. at 141. The denial of women's conscious subjectivity characterizes not only nineteenth century
patriarchy, but much of Western theory and practice. See, e.g., S. DE BEAUvOIR, THE SECOND SEX, at
xx-xxi (H. Parshley trans. 1971); LeClerc, Woman's Word, in NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS: AN AN-
THOLOGY 79 (E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds. 1980); Kristeva, Oscillation Between Power and
Denial, in id. at 165; MacKinnon, Agenda, supra note 277, at 528-44. An analogous denial of con-
scious subjectivity has been traditionally imposed on blacks by whites. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857); MacKinnon, Agenda, supra note 277, at 537 n.54.
279. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Agenda, supra note 277, at 536-44; MacKinnon, Feminist Jurispru-
dence, supra note 277, at 644-45; Williams, supra note 94, at 175, 200. An analogous point has been
powerfully advanced on behalf of blacks by Lawrence, "One More River to Cross"--Recognizing the
Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PER-
SPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 49 (D. Bell ed. 1980); see Bell, A Model Alternative Desegre-
gation Plan, in id. at 125; Freeman, supra note 212, at 1052-57.
280. See Taub, supra note 276, at 362, 387-90, 402.
281. See supra note 2; pp. 946-48.
282. S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 273-304 (1979); Olsen, supra note
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would go unrecognized or be misunderstood. In addition, to identify some
of the most profound mechanisms one must virtually step outside of the
culture. Both because of their frequently marginal positions and their
greater personal stake in change, women are much more likely than men
to consider iconoclastic analytic approaches to the study of sexism.2"3
Another component of a new sex discrimination jurisprudence must be
an awareness that assimilation into existing predominantly male social
structures is an inadequate definition of equality between the sexes and
one that robs equality of much of its transformative potential.' The
principle that only women whose life patterns, skills, and experiences are
virtually identical to those typical of men will be accorded high status and
rewards will, as a practical matter, doom most women to continued subor-
dination. Moreover, the common practice of focusing primarily on fair
access to previously male positions and privileges is based in large part on
androcentric value systems that maintain the hierarchy of male over fe-
male activities. Since women's value systems are often quite different from
those of men, the full participation of women in the process of change
may both depend on and encourage a re-ordering of social priorities.
28 5
The integration of women's perspectives will also stimulate a wide-
ranging debate about which are the most desirable of the many different
ways in which sex equality can be pursued. For example, the life patterns
of female and male workers can be made more similar by providing col-
lective child care and expecting all workers to work full time, or, in a very
different way, by restructuring employment to permit both parents to
share major responsibility for daily care of their young children.2 8 In
male-dominated public discourse, these and similar possibilities are de-
bated only rarely and in oversimplified terms because they concern human
activities that have been relegated to women and devalued. In addition,
the diversity of women's perspectives has been obscured by the practice of
grouping women into a few stereotyped categories defined largely from
male viewpoints. If women's views and experiences are made part of the
283. See Ehrenreich & Piven, The Feminization of Poverty, 31 DISSENT 162, 169-70 (1984);
MacKinnon, Agenda, supra note 277, at 532-38; MacKinnon, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note
277, at 636-37; Shields, The Variability Hypothesis: The History of a Biological Model of Sex Dif-
ferences in Intelligence, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & S0C'Y 769, 794 (1982).
284. See supra pp. 947-49; C. MACKINNON, supra note 212, at 118-27; Note, supra note 190, at
487-99.
285. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVEL-
OPMENT 5-23, 167-74 (1982).
286. See supra p. 946 (discussing various possible changes and their consequences). If the option
of restructuring employment were chosen, relatives and friends could assist the parents in the care of
their children-and also assist in the care of dependent adults-a task that now falls primarily on
daughters, mothers, and wives.
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public debate, their diversity will further broaden both the terms and sub-
jects of that debate.
C. The Influence of Judging on the Process of Social Change
By shaping the terms in which conflicts are defined and public debate is
conducted, judging influences popular and political consciousness in a way
that transcends the resolution of particular disputes. Thus, the impact of
judicial action consists not only of its immediate practical consequences,
but also of the influence of judges' thinking on people's understanding of
the underlying issues. From this perspective, judicial decisions should be
evaluated based not only on their conclusions but also on the clarity and
persuasiveness of their analysis of the broader issues that a given case
presents.
An increased emphasis in judicial decisions on explicit debate about the
values at stake in sex discrimination cases and the harms caused by sex
discrimination would contribute significantly to the struggle for equality
between the sexes. The process of social transformation necessary to ob-
tain major improvements in the situation of women will, for the most
part, take place in other forums. Nonetheless, the fact that judges often
participate in the struggle against sexism through the influence of their
ideas, as well as through the concrete impact of their decisions, argues for
opinions that are more, rather than less, explicit about the substantive
analyses underlying their legal conclusions. Moreover, open discussion of
the issues at the core of the struggle for sex equality is particularly impor-
tant because challenges to sex differentiation are so threatening to most
people.
In brief, judges cannot determine the outcome of the struggle about sex
equality, but they can create opportunities for action by others and they
can influence the ideological climate in which the struggle occurs. By ex-
posing the limits of the equal rights theory that emerges from the Su-
preme Court's current treatment of sex discrimination cases, this Article
hopes to broaden the scope of future debate.
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